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The Validation of a Methodology for Assessing the Impact of Hybrid Simulation
Training in the Minimization of Adverse Outcomes in Surgery
Peter J. Fabri, M.D.

ABSTRACT

The Institute of Medicine report “To Err is Human,” released in late 1999, raised
the issue of human error in medicine to a new level of attention. This study examines the
frequency, severity, and type (FST) of errors associated with postoperative surgical
complications at a tertiary care, university-based medical center, addressing the
intersection of three domains: patient safety, graduate medical education, and simulationbased training. The study develops and validates a classification system for medical error
that is specific to surgery, affirming reliability internally and externally. Baseline data on
the FST of errors is collected over a 12-month period. A hybrid, simulation based
training session is developed, validated, and applied to a cohort of surgical residents,
focusing on the three most common types of errors identified from pilot data, namely
judgment error, incomplete understanding of the problem, and inattention to detail, all
human factor errors. The impact of the training is evaluated by measuring the FST of
errors occurring during the 6-month period following the training sessions. The study
demonstrates that there is a continuous decrement in the incidence of postoperative
complications and a proportional decrease in error, which starts at the beginning of the

vii

baseline data collection and continues linearly throughout the 12 baseline months and
subsequent 6 post-training months. There is no additional decrement in the rate of
change following training, and no change in the rate of the index errors following the
training. This study suggests that surgical error is frequent (>2%) and principally due to
human factors rather than systems or communication. This study demonstrates that
creating an environment where residents are continuously involved in identifying and
characterizing errors results in a significant and sustained decrease in postoperative
complications and the errors specifically associated with them. Contrary to expectations,
a validated, well-designed, active-learning training module does not result in an
additional identifiable improvement in patient outcome or in the incidence of index
errors. These results are at variance with many recent studies addressing medical error
and, if verified by additional studies, challenge several strongly held ideas related to
patient safety training.

viii

1. Introduction

Since the publication of the Institute of Medicine report To Err Is Human in
2000,1(p25) patient safety has become a high priority in U.S. healthcare and in medical
education.2-10 Earlier work by Leape,11-13 Gaba,14 and many others15-21 had identified the
importance of active and structured interventions to decrease the risk of error at all levels
of medical practice. In perhaps the earliest work addressing the sociology of surgery,
Bosk reported how an academic department of surgery addressed error within its
culture.22 Most notably, these studies have identified that the two largest areas of risk in
healthcare are errors17 related to surgery and to medication errors. Furthermore, many
academic surgeons have felt that having residents “in house” 24 hours per day improves
patient care and enhances patient safety, particularly as healthcare has become
increasingly complex. The residents were believed to be able to “work around” many of
the system problems that have been introduced by modern technology. Said differently,
resident physicians, being trainees, are part of the “cause” of medical error, but at the
same time may have been an important component of the “safety net” that identifies and
minimizes error. The purpose of this study is to determine if a structured, simulationbased training program, aimed at surgical residents, can improve actual measured patient
outcomes.

1

Traditional studies of error analysis23, 24 have identified three broad approaches to
minimizing error: redesigning systems to “eliminate” the risk of error, creating methods
to “highlight” an error so that it is immediately recognized, and developing approaches to
mitigate the adverse consequences of errors when they happen. Numerous studies have
addressed methods of redesigning medical systems to make them safer.25-28 Like the
nuclear power and aviation industries, which have served as the principal “models” for
error reduction in medicine,29, 30 high technology areas in healthcare (such as radiation
therapy and anesthesiology) may lend themselves well to reengineering in order to
mitigate error risk. To the degree that surgery is inseparable from anesthesia, surgery too
may be improved by efforts to reduce system error. But when surgical errors occur in the
operating room, it is rare that the technology itself is the cause of the problem. Rather, it
is the human decision process or human manipulation of the technology that leads to
difficulties.31 It is unclear how much of the error risk of surgery can be reduced by
redesigning systems or reengineering.
Team training and crew resource management,32 two terms used to describe
structured training of dedicated teams in the aviation industry, have been applied to the
operating room environment33-36 and critical care areas37, 38. This certainly has direct
application to the “system” errors which occur in the operating room39. Many
“catastrophic” events that occasionally occur in the operating room, such as wrong side
surgery, operating on the wrong patient, or leaving a sponge or instrument within a
patient can be “eliminated” by improving the teamwork among individuals. Similarly, no
one can argue that improving communication and teamwork in the operating room is not
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desirable. But it has yet to be demonstrated that this will decrease surgical error or
improve the outcome of surgery.

Some authors have suggested that it is not possible to eliminate the risk of error
when the principle component is human-to-human interaction40(p198). This situation,
individual human-to-human interaction, would appear to be the case in much of surgical
care, which raises the possibility that error relating to the thought processes, decision
processes, and technical processes of the surgeon may be an unavoidable consequence.
Although the group of individuals who work together within an operating room is often
referred to as the “surgical team,” most authors41 admit that this is a haphazard team at
best, and perhaps might actually be considered three or four separate “teams” that often
work at cross purposes to each other. Increasing communication among these separate
teams will improve surgical care. But it will not address the category of errors which
originate from the decisions and technical activities of the individual surgeon.

It is critically important to define the types of errors that occur in the operating
room, their frequency, and their severity. In addition, it is important to attempt to
identify the cause of the errors, to define whether they are amenable to reengineering or
training. Many error studies have identified a very high percentage (often greater than
80%) of errors being due to human factors. Some authors have suggested that this is just
the “sharp end”42 of the problem, where it actually occurs, but that in fact there is a
cascade of events beginning with system errors on the “blunt end” upstream in the
process. Is this the case with surgical error? To date, no study has attempted to answer
this question in relation to surgical errors.
3

Finally, many investigations in human error have suggested that the presence of
humans even in highly technical processes is essential, because it is not possible to design
out all potential errors in highly complex systems40(p180). The creativity and adaptability
of the human participant allows new and previously unrecognized problems to be
addressed in real time. However, given the potential for a large number of such problem
solving experiences in medicine (and in surgery) the potential for error is probably an
intrinsic component. Some have even argued that it is surprising that error does not occur
more frequently. If this is true, what is the role of surgical trainees in minimizing error?
As surgical care has become more acute, more complex, and more technologically
sophisticated, have residents been the “glue” that holds a loosely coupled, highly
complex system together? If residents have served the role of identifying and minimizing
the consequences of errors that are “built in” to our systems, is it possible that training
residents to recognize and respond to error will improve the measurable outcome of
surgical care?

This study will address the intersection of three specific domains within the broad
field of medicine: error in surgery, the use of simulated training, and surgical residency.
This study will develop and apply a structured training module to introduce residents to
the most common types of error, as measured during the preliminary phase of data
collection. Creating this model will require the prior development of a classification
system for error in the surgical environment, measurement of the frequency and types of
error and their consequences, and measurement of the patient outcomes that follow.
After design and application of the training program, this research will assess the impact
of the training program on errors occurring after the cohort of surgical residents has been
4

“trained” by repeating the measurement of the frequency, types, and severity of errors in
the post-training period and the patient outcomes that occur.

The specific goals are:

1. to develop a satisfactory classification for medical error within the
discipline of surgery,

2. to validate the instruments developed to measure medical error,

3. to define the baseline incidence of error occurring in patients who have
complications of surgery,

4. to define the most common types of error associated with surgical
complications,

5. to measure the impact of an error in the actual outcome of patients,

6. to develop a reliable training program that uses simulation to train
surgical residents to be aware of and avoid medical errors, and

7. to determine if a simulation-based training program delivered to an
entire cohort of surgical residents can result in a measurable change in
patient outcome.

The questions (research hypotheses) which will be tested are:
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1. Is it possible to create a valid classification system for errors occurring
in surgery.

2. Can this classification system demonstrate reliability when used by
practicing academic physicians.

3. Can we determine a baseline incidence of the types of common errors.

4. Can we reliably identify the most common types of errors in an
academic surgical setting.

5. Can we measure the impact of error on the actual outcomes of patients.

6. Can we develop and validate a simulation-based training module for
resident physicians.

7. Can a validated training module improve surgical outcomes after a
cohort of residents are trained.

It is important to clarify what this research will NOT address.

1. It will not consider errors outside of the field of surgery in an academic
medical center environment. By design, this study only addresses reported
“complications” occurring after surgical procedures in an academic
medical center.

2. It will not address redesigning systems and processes in the hope of
eliminating error. The only designed intervention is a training session for
6

residents. There will be no attempt to address underlying or latent
problems that might be amenable to redesign or reengineering.

3. It will not address “near-miss” or latent errors that have not already led
to adverse patient outcome. The original design of this study included
measuring “near-miss” events concurrently, but this was very
unsuccessful, as described later in this document.

4. It will not address team training or training in groups. Although the
“team” is assumed in addressing a surgical event, surgical residents are
trained individually. The residents are working in a simulated clinical
environment with a nurse, but the nurse is an “actor” and not a “trainee.”

5. It will not address the immediate effects of the training experience, but
rather will focus on the downstream impact on patient outcome. Many
studies measure short term, direct effects of simulation-based training,
such as performance on a technical procedure or a multiple choice text.
This study only measures far transfer as measured by patient outcomes at a
later time.
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2. Literature Review

This study addresses three primary content domains and several subsidiary areas.
Each has an extensive and largely non-overlapping literature base. Each of these is
reviewed individually to provide the relevant background information to inform the
reader, and then briefly summarized in the aggregate.

2.1 Literature on Error

This literature review was conducted by first performing a National Library of
Medicine search from 1966 to the present using the keywords “error” and “patient
safety.” Subsidiary searches were conducted using the term “graduate medical
education” and the term “simulation.” All references included in the website of the
Cognitive Technologies Laboratory (kindly provided by Dr. Richard Cook) were
reviewed. Searches were performed using the State of Florida library system on the
terms “error”, “human error”, “medical error”, and “patient safety.” All books identified
in the search were read and critiqued in detail. The bibliographies of all items identified
by the above searches were extensively reviewed to identify important prior work to
avoid omission. While great effort was made to be inclusive, this work addresses several
major, overlapping (and some non-overlapping) domains and an immense literature base.
It is therefore possible that something has been overlooked.
8

Man has been concerned with the subject of error at least since the time of Plato.
In The Republic43, Plato addresses the “shadow on the wall” and its lack of total harmony
with the ideal. Later, in the middle ages, Roger Bacon44 (13th century) referred to
“offendicula” or impediments of thought and produced perhaps the first “classification
system” of error, recognizing four “obstacles” to inquiry: overweight of authority,
slavery to custom, dominance of popular opinion, and the concealment of ignorance by
pretense of knowledge. Centuries later, Francis Bacon44 also addressed human error
from a philosophical basis, offering a more “advanced” classification system. He
described four “idols”: the idol of the Tribe--the insistence that Nature is as the human
mind would have it; the idol of the Cave--limitation of outlook making men nonunderstanding and intolerant of others’ ways; the idol of the Forum--the undue deference
to public opinion; and the idol of the Theater--the conditions of the scholastic contingent
directed at authority, tradition, vested interests and false notions. It is interesting to
reflect back on these descriptions as we attempt to understand error in the modern world.
Each of these authors of antiquity (and others) focused on error as a component of the
philosophy of the mind, or metaphysics.
The 20th century saw the introduction of in-depth and structured approaches to
human error in the new fields of cognitive psychology, neurophysiology and psychiatry.
These domains dominated the study of error from the early 1900’s through the 1960’s.
Even Freud45 described a concept of human error as a component of his theories of
psychoanalysis, leading to the commonly used phrase “Freudian slip.” Codman, in the
early 1900’s, introduced perhaps the first structured classification system of surgical
error30, 46. He reviewed 123 surgical errors in 337 patients and proposed a set of seven
9

types of error: “Error due to lack of technical knowledge or skill, error due to lack of
surgical judgment, error due to lack of care or equipment, error due to lack of diagnostic
skill, the patient’s unconquerable disease, the patient’s refusal of treatment, and the
calamities of surgery or those accidents and complications over which we have no known
control.” This list is surprisingly similar (with changes in language use) to the results of
the present investigation. In Managing Your Mind 47, Jastrow (1931) presented a new,
“modernized” classification of error which defined three subjective and three objective
idols: the idol of the Self- the projection of the subjective upon Nature; the idol of the
Thrill- the favoring of the romantic and dramatic; the idol of the Web- the spinning of
imaginative data; the idol of the Mass- undue deference to popular opinion; the idol of
the Mold- restriction to one’s own class-cast of mind and outlook; and the idol of the
Cult- bondage to dogma and ‘isms. Later (1936) Jastrow wrote in The Story of Human
Error an entire chapter entitled “Error in Medicine”, which describes the historical
progress of medical thought, concluding with the provocative thought. “Today not only
the physician must know the pitfalls that are the errors of medicine, but the patient must
also know them if he too will avoid them.” Although these writers were describing a
much more concrete concept of error and error classification than their historical
antecedents, their works still largely address error as philosophical and metaphysical in
nature.

Studies in the 1960’s and 1970’s were heavily motivated by new advances in
behavioral psychology. It wasn’t until the late 70’s, however, that interest in nuclear
reactor risk resulted in the development of systematic and mathematically based studies
of human reliability analysis, systems engineering, and human factors research. As
10

computer power increased, concepts that had been developed in the fields of artificial
intelligence and neural networks were applied to system engineering, and error analysis
became more analytical and process driven. A specific formulation based on a rule-based
computer system was proposed by Newell and Simon48 known as the “General Problem
Solver.” Rouse49, Rasmussen50, and Reason40, among others, advanced this concept of
rule-based systems and independently developed coherent concepts of human error,
which built on each other. Rouse described a problem-solving approach based on an “if
(situation) …then (action)” approach to human error. This is often referred to simply as a
“rule-based” system.
Rasmussen51 extended this concept into a “skill-rule-knowledge” classification
system. This concept forms the kernel of our modern understanding of error. He
categorized error as being skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-based. He formulated a
baseline, problem-solving method using cognitive knowledge, a method used by young
or new learners, but also reactivated in more advanced learners when solving new or
complex problems. In this situation, the individual explores a large, internal knowledge
base and develops a unique solution to the problem (knowledge-based system). As
individuals develop a sense of recurrent patterns within problems, they identify a set of
rules, some formal, some informal, which can be applied in the same or similar settings
(rule-based system). When individuals become very familiar with the rules and can
identify when the rules need to be modified to fit novel applications, problem solving
becomes dominated by utilization of stored patterns of preprogrammed internal
instructions which are organized within a time-space domain (skill-based system).
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Error40(p9) was thus classified (Table 1) as depending on a violation of a corpus of
knowledge, breaking a specific rule, or the failure of a highly developed skill.
Table 1. Error Classification According to Reason40(p12)
Type of Error

Classification

Timing

Knowledge based

Knowledge based mistake

Evaluation/Planning

Rule based

Rule based mistake

Evaluation/Planning

Skill based

Lapse (storage)

Execution

Slip (execution)

More recently, Senders16 brought together 22 internationally recognized error
experts for a workshop on human error (The Bellagio Conference). They reviewed and
discussed the current classification systems, theories of error, and approaches to error
mitigation and concluded that there is no single, useful classification system for error.
They argue that classification of error is uniquely related to the purpose of the research,
and that no single theoretical model of human error will either explain all error or
eliminate its occurrence40(p10). Wallace 52 essentially repeated this concept of the absence

of a unifying classification system. He did, however, emphasize the importance of
determining the reliability of any classification system, citing that a minimum of 70%
reliability is essential to analyze data in a meaningful and unbiased manner. However, a
noted characteristic of the existing literature on human error is the absence of reliability
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testing or hypothesis testing. This study will address these absences by applying
statistical design and rigorous data analysis.

2.2 Literature on Medical Error

The first modern, “scientific” studies to call attention to the high incidence of
error in the practice of medicine emerged from Leape’s work with the Harvard Practice
Group Study in 199153, 54. Bogner17, 55 (1994), from the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, published an extensive review of the published work in the field of
medical error. This work began with the concepts of Reason (which was entirely nonmedical) and incorporated ideas developed by Leape, Gaba, Woods, and others. Gaba14,
focused principally on error within the field of anesthesiology. He presented a thorough
description of system re-engineering for safety and explained the role of team training in
minimizing error. This laid the scientific ground work for the first major “call to arms,”
the now famous Institute of Medicine report in 2000 entitled To Err is Human. This
document, extrapolating from the data from the Harvard Practice Group Study, estimated
that perhaps more people die as a consequence of medical error than from automobile
accidents. To Err Is Human, in part because it represented the views of such a highly
recognized and credible group (The Institute of Medicine,) could not be ignored. It
triggered an avalanche of interest in the subject of error in medicine, both in the scientific
community and in the lay press. Since then, numerous articles have reinforced the costs
and implications of medical error. Recently, many authors have attempted to develop
classification systems for medical error, based on the early works of Reason 23, 40, 56, 57and
more recently summarized by Zhao and Olivera58. Most of the published studies of
13

medical error relate to the office-based practice of family medicine59-62 and the errors are
predominantly clerical, administrative, and prescription related, while the preponderance
of studies conducted in hospitals look at medication errors (prescribing, dispensing,
administering). Other studies focus on very specific technical procedures, the
complications and learning curves associated with them, and the role of training on shortterm and directly measurable technical outcomes. There are no current studies which
address a classification system for error in the broad field of general surgery or methods
to address the role of training in minimizing the impact of medical error in surgery.

During the same era in which medical error was being highlighted, attention was
drawn to the role of residents in adverse patient outcomes. Although much of the
published literature has focused on the role of work hours and fatigue on resident
performance, the critically important role of residents in both causing and preventing
errors has also been emphasized. The introduction of the “Outcome Project” 63, 64 by the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education in 2001 was intended to transform
resident training from an apprenticeship model to a competency-based model and thus
assure that residents are fully trained and competent to practice medicine. Of perhaps
more importance, however, the “Outcome Project” formalized the already growing
emphasis of supervision of residents in the conduct of patient care. Simultaneously
American society was no longer comfortable having residents “practice” on human
patients. The combination of the recognition of the incidence of error, the hazards
associated with trainees and young physicians, and the need to find new ways to train
young physicians contributed substantially to the current emphasis on the development of
high-fidelity simulation techniques in healthcare, and particularly in surgery.
14

2.3 Literature on Simulation

The earliest formal medical simulation devices were used to train students to
listen to heart sounds (Harvey). More recently, mannequin-based simulators65 have been
used in training healthcare professionals in the technical aspects of advanced cardiac life
support (ACLS) and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Unlike the aviation industry,
to which medical training is currently being compared and which has had high-fidelity
simulators for decades, the medical community did not accept the importance of
simulation in physician training until the public recognized the high cost of complications
from laparoscopic cholecystectomy66. Several simulation devices have since appeared
and have been formally tested and validated67-70. Recent studies have addressed the role
of technique simulators (e.g. laparoscopic surgery) in shortening the time for learning and
perhaps decreasing technical complications71-75. Resnick76, 77 et al have developed and
evaluated a set of evaluation processes to assess resident performance. As reported by
Gaba14, 78, simulation has become a necessary tool in the training of anesthesiologists.
Simulators of sufficient fidelity have been developed to allow realistic demonstrations of
physiologic changes as a result of anesthetic agents, pharmacologic agents, and other
acute physiologic alterations which can occur in an anesthetized patient undergoing an
operation79. To date, most of the published work in the area of simulation in surgery has
focused on technical simulators80. There is an absence of work in the use of simulation in
training physicians to deal with errors which occur in surgical decisions and surgical
practice81.
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A number of investigators have looked at medical error with an effort to
quantitate its incidence, define a classification system, and develop methods of
prevention. These have largely focused on the outpatient practice of family medicine. In
this setting, most of the errors appear to be related to scheduling, communication, and
prescribing, rather than errors that are directly linked to interventions, as would be the
case in studying surgical errors.

2.4 Literature on Graduate Medical Education
There is an extensive literature on the subject of Graduate Medical Education82,
including a focused journal entitled “Academic Medicine.” Although there have been
numerous articles on the use of simulation in resident education83, including several in
the field of surgery, there do not seem to be any published studies that look at patient
outcome as a consequence of training in general or simulation-based training in
particular. In 2001, the Accreditation Council on Graduate Medical Education
(ACGME) introduced a new paradigm for the education and training of residents, the
“Outcome Project63, 64.” This ambitious undertaking focused initially on the control of
the excessive numbers of work hours served per week by the typical resident, and which
presumably was related to error and adverse patient outcomes. Studies on sleep
deprivation, fatigue, and stress documented the adverse effect of these factors on patient
safety. However, a more subtle yet critically important aspect of the “Outcome Project”
has emerged over the past five years, as the program has been phased in. Traditionally,
resident training has been a sort of “apprenticeship” for the advanced training of a trained
“general physician.” As medicine has become more complex, it has become clear that an
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individual is not “capable” at the completion of medical school plus an internship, and
that the residency is best considered an extension of medical education and training.
Concepts from the field of cognitive psychology and learning theory have been
introduced into the medical education lexicon to address the process and methods
involved in the progressive acquisition of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Dreyfus and
Dreyfus84 describe the evolution of competence from “novice”, to “advanced beginner”,
through “competent”, “proficient”, and “expert”. Competency is defined as the ability to
execute a task or process independently and without supervision. Residents, by
definition, are not fully competent, which implies that there is an increased risk of error
associated with activities performed by residents. Inherent in the concept of a
progressive, competency-based residency curriculum is the consideration that structured,
systematic programs, formally defined in written goals and objectives, will focus and
enhance the acquisition of competence in a progressive fashion. Patient safety is one of
the “core competencies” that must be addressed within the formal curriculum of
residency. Recent studies have begun to examine issues of patient safety within the
education program of residency training.85-89

2.5 Literature on Classification of Error (Taxonomy)
Vincent 30 provides a thorough analysis of the history of error analysis in
medicine and a context for further study in optimizing patient safety. Kopec summarizes
the history of error classification and assesses several classification systems for medical
error assessment.90 Several authors 91-100 have focused on the development and use of
classification systems for error and their limitations.101 Studies have also examined the
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“chain” of events that make up a cascade, leading ultimately to error.20, 102-104 A detailed
and comprehensive classification system of error has been developed by the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)105.
Unfortunately, it is so comprehensive and complex that it requires a fully trained medical
record coding specialist with supplementary training to be useful. Other classification
systems have been “purpose specific” and do not lend themselves to use in other fields or
circumstances. Wallace 52and others, in reviewing the state of the art in error
classification have concluded that a single, all-purpose classification system (although
one has been developed by the JCAHO) is not likely to be suitable for the “real-time”
analysis of errors in healthcare. Wallace goes further to describe the ideal qualities of a
classification system, specifically that it must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive
(MEE) and that it must be reliable (reproducible) and valid (accurate). This review of the
published literature in medical errors confirms the remarkable diversity of classification
systems, but more importantly, highlights the stark absence of credible validation of the
classification system or the impact of classification on a measurable outcome.

2.6 Literature on Transfer of Training

Much of the modern psychology literature (as well as works in the fields of
education, communication, and engineering) emphasizes the importance of transfer of
training. According to Noe106, “Transfer of training refers to trainees effectively and
continually applying what they learned in training (knowledge, skills, behaviors,
cognitive strategies) to their jobs.” He further describes in detail the currently accepted
model of the transfer process, which includes generalization of training to the job and
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maintenance of learned material. Important antecedent work by Barnett107, Ford108,
Tracey et al109, and Wexley and Baldwin110 provides the scientific background for a more
comprehensive analysis of transfer and its evaluation than will be addressed in this study.
However, the idea of far transfer is critical to the analysis of this research—outcomes that
occur in a different setting, at a different time, and not identical with the trained tasks.
The published work and formal coursework by Brannick and Levine111 assisted in the
design of the training session and the outcome measurements used in this study.

2.7 Literature Summary

This study utilizes an expansive corpus of literature in the areas of human error,
error in medicine, and transfer of training, plus an additional extensive literature on the
subject of graduate medical education in general and the “Outcome Project” of the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in particular. Since
the actual work performed in this study is in itself novel, the literature serves as an
important background and platform for the investigations. Thus, the specific purpose of
this study is to examine carefully the intersection of patient safety, graduate medical
education, and the use of simulation. More specifically, this study attempts to identify
whether the use of validated, simulation-based training can decrease the incidence, type
and severity of medical errors in the actual practice of medicine. The study brings
together the expertise of a large number of individuals and entities to address this
question. Because this question has never been asked, a major component of this study is
the development and validation of the instruments to measure error in surgery, and to
quantify the baseline incidence.
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3. Methods

An extensive review of the published literature was done in May 2005 for the
purpose of defining the status of classification of medical errors in surgery. The review
showed that most studies on medical error were in the primary care area (e.g. internal
medicine, family medicine, pediatrics) and primarily addressed scheduling and
communication errors. Prior work had identified a general taxonomy of error
(organizational, mechanical, human factor), and this was used for the higher level
classification. Since nothing has been published to identify causes of error within
surgery, a list was generated from this researcher’s prior experience of 30 years of
weekly surgical morbidity and mortality conferences at two universities (Ohio State
University; University of South Florida) combined with an analysis of the existing
literature, previously cited.

3.1 Classification and Scoring Systems
Prompted by the work of Senders16 and of Wallace52, which affirms that there is
no single, standard, acceptable taxonomy for the classification of error, this study
developed a new classification system that was derived from the strongest published
work and tailored to the common vocabulary of an academic surgeon. This classification
system presumes that a complication has occurred, assesses whether an error was
involved, determines the characteristics of the error, establishes a semi-quantitative score
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for patient outcome, estimates the degree to which the error produced the complication,
and classifies the type of error which occurred.

Error Presence. Predicated on the knowledge that not all adverse events are
derivative of an error, the first criterion for the evaluator is the binary decision that there
was or was not an error.

Patient Outcome. This study develops an outcome score that was patient centric,
using a 5 point discrete classification scale, modified from the disability classification of
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners severity of injury scale. The
scores used in this study are

1 = If there was no adverse effect;

2 = If there was an identifiable adverse effect, which increased length of stay, but
there was no discernible harm to the patient;

3 = If there was clear harm to the patient, but the patient either did or would be
expected to fully recover with only temporary disability;

4 = If there was clear harm to the patient, the patient is expected to survive and
improve, but with a permanent disability,

5 = If the patient died.
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The outcome score is determined independent of the presence or type of error. If
there was no error, the evaluation is terminated at this point, providing only a descriptor
of the adverse event, the selection of “no error,” and the outcome score.

Error Characteristics. For those cases where the evaluator determines that there
has been an error, the first question is if the error occurred during planning or during
execution. Then, is the error a slip (correct action was planned but it was not performed
correctly) or a mistake (incorrect action planned). Mistakes are not further subdivided
into rule-based and knowledge-based, because of the difficulty of interpreting the “intent”
and thought process of the “actors” at the time. This distinction will be addressed further
in the subclassification of types of error.

Types of Error. The classification of types of error commenced with the three
broad categories of error: organizational or system error, technical or mechanical error,
and human error or human factors error. Since the term “technical error” in surgery has a
different meaning than in industry (a technical error in surgery is in fact a human error),
the term “mechanical error” is used to represent a situation where equipment
malfunctioned. Since the most common errors evaluated were thought to be
manifestations of human error (as described in most of the publications previously cited),
and the focus of this research is on training humans, there was no further attempt to subclassify organizational and mechanical errors.

Human error, the specific focus of this exploration, is further sub-classified. This
classification system began with Reason’s three categories: knowledge-based mistakes,
rule-based mistakes, and skill-based slips and lapses, using language more familiar to a
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surgeon. In considering knowledge-based mistakes, the phrase “incomplete
understanding of the problem” is used as a non-judgmental descriptor. For rule-based
mistakes, “judgment error” was substituted. In surgery, and in particular in mandated
reviews of surgical complications, this concept appears to be widely understood and
accepted. Skill-based errors (surgery being a discipline heavily dependent on the
application of very advanced skills) were further subdivided into carelessness/inattention
to detail (to address the notion of lapse) and technical error—in the surgical sense (to
address the concept of slip). The entire list of error types is presented below:

Types of Medical Errors as Used in This Study

1. equipment failure (mechanical error)

2. health system error (organizational error)

3. incomplete understanding of problem

4. failure to use established protocol

5. carelessness/carelessness/inattention to detail

6. error in diagnosis

7. communication error

8. judgment error

9. delay error
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10. error of omission

11. technique error

Error types are referred throughout this text by the coding numbers used in the computer
reporting system, which are two digit adaptations of the listed error types, preceded by a
“2.” Thus equipment failure is ErrorID 21.

Finally, to define a link between the error analysis and the current classification of
core competencies in resident education, the evaluator was asked to identify which of the
GME core competencies (Medical Knowledge, Patient Care, Communication,
Professionalism, Practice Based Learning and Improvement, Systems Based Practice)
were involved in the error/complication process.

This analysis of error taxonomy was reviewed with 6 senior academic surgeons at
the University of South Florida and was modified based on their input. The total number
of years of academic surgical experience among the group of individuals was in excess of
150. Although all are currently members of the faculty at a single university (University
of South Florida), their individual origin and experience is from a large number of
different universities with significantly different backgrounds. The extensive and diverse
background of these individuals provided a broadly based initial draft classification. In
order to enhance the preliminary “face validity” of the classification system, more
extensive evaluation was achieved by means of a formal presentation of this classification
system and the subsequent scoring template to the combined surgical faculty and
residents at surgical grand rounds. Feedback from the aggregate department membership
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was incorporated into the classification and the scoring template. Iterative changes were
made in the template to enhance clarity, incorporating recommendations of the surgical
faculty until the document reflected the collective understanding of the surgical faculty
regarding error in surgery. Input of the residents was critical in improving the “userfriendliness” of the actual instrument used in the planned weekly complication
assessment process.

This preliminary classification list was sent externally to 8 individuals who were
selected on the basis of being nationally recognized academic surgical educators who had
published in the field of patient safety, as obtained by doing a literature search of the
National Library of Medicine. These individuals were each asked (Appendix 1) to
respond anonymously, defining which of the items on the list were characteristics of
medical error in surgery. They were also given the opportunity to provide additional
error types to the list. A second request was sent to all 8 individuals to enhance return.
A total of 4 individuals responded. There was uniform agreement with the classification
system and comments of strong support from the respondents.

3.2 The Scoring Template

The higher level classification (organizational, mechanical, human) based on the
published literature on error was combined with the broader error list, verified by the
initial survey of surgical safety experts into a single scoring template, which would be
used as the survey instrument throughout the remainder of the study. This template was
reviewed with two experts in measurement (JK, College of Education; SN, College of
Nursing) as non-surgical experts to assure that the document was easily understandable
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without need for “insider information.” These “experts” provided critical insight into the
need for and methods of establishing reliability and validity.

The final template (Appendix 2) included the following fields, each of which was
described in both a glossary of terms (Appendix 3) and the instructions (Appendix 4):

A. Patient ID—an open field to allow a numerical sequence of cases, for example
1,2,3,4,5 at a presentation conference to affirm the order of the cases or the case
scenario (A,B,C) during validation. Any inadvertent actual identification other
than an ordinal was removed upon receipt.

B. Reviewer—an open field where a reviewer could place initials when paired
comparisons were being performed. Otherwise, anything in this field was deleted.

C. Score—an interval scale for scoring the severity of complication into five
levels

5 = The patient died during this episode of care

4 = The patient recovered but with a significant permanent disability

3 = The patient recovered but with a significant temporary disability

2 = The patient recovered without disability but with prolongation of
hospitalization

1 = The patient had a “complication” but without any impact on the
patient’s outcome.
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D. Complication description—3 -5 word, open text “key words” describing the
complication

E. Medical Error—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether the reviewer
believed an error had occurred

F. Evaluation—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether an error occurred
during patient evaluation

G. Execution—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether an error occurred
during patient treatment

H. Slip—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether the error was caused by
doing the appropriate thing but not doing it correctly.

I. Mistake—a binary field (Yes or No) describing whether the error was caused by
doing something inappropriate (This field did not distinguish two subtypes—rulebased mistake and cognitive-mistake—as it was thought unlikely that academic
surgeons would be able to consistently make this differentiation).

J. Types of Error—a classification list of the types of errors (see above) obtained
from the preliminary validation phase of the study. The classification recognized
the previously published division of types of error into organizational, technical,
and human factor. Because these terms can have ambiguous meaning in clinical
surgery, they were renamed “equipment failure (mechanical error), health system
error (organizational error), and a comprehensive list of subcategories of human
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factor error to represent various categories of human factor error. Additional
open spaces were included to allow individuals to add free text.

K. ACGME Core Competency—a listing of the six ACGME core competencies to
determine which competency seemed to be associated with the error. The actual
wording of the competencies was altered slightly from the ACGME format for
simplicity

1. Delivery of Patient Care

2. Insufficient or Inaccurate Medical Knowledge

3. Adult Learning; Problem Solving

4. Interpersonal and Communication Skills

5. Professional Behavior

6. Knowing the Healthcare System

To assure consistency in understanding/interpretation, a glossary defining the
terms used in the scoring template and instructions was prepared. Where possible,
definitions were taken from the published literature (Appendix 3). Evaluators were sent a
detailed instruction sheet. (Appendix4). The instruction sheet was produced to guide
individuals in the completion of the scoring template.
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3.3 Validation

3.3.1 External Validation. To further validate the instrument, three surgical scenarios
were created. (Appendices 5, 6, 7) Each scenario included sufficient .information for an
expert to be able to understand the clinical case and its implications, and sufficient
information to be able to provide an opinion on the nature of the types of error which had
occurred. The three scenarios, the scoring template that resulted from the previously
described validation, the detailed glossary of terms, and detailed instructions for
completing the template were sent to a total of 165 individuals (15 each from USF and
from 10 other academic institutions). The individuals and institutions were selected from
the current roster of members of the Association of Academic Surgeons, a large
membership organization of academic surgeons of all academic ranks throughout the
United States. First, all institutions which had at least 15 members of the Association of
Academic Surgeons were identified from the current organization membership list, sorted
by state and by institution. Ten institutions from this list, with at least 15 members each,
were selected in order to provide geographic distribution across the United States without
obvious redundancy. Within each institution selected, a random selection of 15
individuals was made, using a random number table for selection. 15 individuals from
the University of South Florida, all academic surgeons, were included as an internal
control, since these individuals had been exposed to the process, had attended a
presentation of the methodology, and had participated in discussions regarding the use of
the template. This subgroup thus had greater “training” than the remaining 150 academic
surgeons.
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The entire packet was submitted to each individual by direct mail. Return
envelopes were included with an identification of the institution, but not the individual,
on the envelope, to identify institutional origin but retain anonymity. This was carefully
explained in the instructions. A number of packets were returned as non-deliverable
indicating that the individual had moved to another university or had left academic
surgery. Other packets were forwarded to the individual who had moved, and these were
identified with the initial institution to which the packet was sent, as the individual had
had documented experience at that institution in the recent past (forwarding was
determined by the US Post Office and this maintained the anonymity of the respondents).

Data from the external validation were entered into an Excel spreadsheet by a
member of the staff to assure that any identifying information that might have been
included was removed. All data were entered in coded format. Data entry was reverified
to assure accuracy.

3.3.2 Internal Validation. The author and one senior surgical colleague attended
Morbidity and Mortality Conference at the University of South Florida (USF) over a
fifteen month period and simultaneously scored the cases which were presented by senior
residents and discussed by the surgical faculty. The first three months of reviews were
used as a “training period” and the two reviewers compared their observations and
discussed differences in interpretation. Following the training period, data were collected
over the subsequent 12 months. Cases were included if both reviewers attended the same
conference and submitted a completed template after listening to the case presentation
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and discussion. 72 cases were analyzed by both reviewers. The results of the templates
for these cases were compared.

3.4 Case Review Methodology and Data Collection

The scoring template, used in paper format for the validation studies, was
converted to an identical electronic format and combined with the mandatory weekly
complication report of the USF Department of Surgery. Each week all residents assigned
with senior responsibility routinely completed a complication report electronically, in
which all surgical procedures performed are listed, together with all complications and
deaths. In addition, with approval of the Chairman of the Department and the Program
Director of the Surgical Residency, the residents are required to complete the error report
as a component of the weekly Morbidity and Mortality Report. The data relating to the
error reporting template are “stripped” electronically from the submitted report and
automatically transferred without patient identification into a separate electronic
database. No Personal Health Information is included in the error report, assuring the
protection of the patients forming the basis of the report. The identity of the reporting
resident is also not included in the error data report, assuring the anonymity of the
resident. This database is made available to the investigator only after any and all
identifying information had been electronically removed and responses coded into digital
format. The Morbidity and Mortality report provides the data to create the monthly tally
of the total number of surgical procedures performed and the total number of
complications reported. No patient identification or personal health information is
transmitted to the investigator either by the electronic data transfer or the departmental
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reports. Although a subset of the cases included in this study are discussed at the
Department of Surgery weekly Morbidity and Morality Conference, information from the
conference is not used in this study except in the isolated circumstance of the direct
comparison of the analysis of outcomes for internal validation using the templates of two
specific faculty, collected over 12 months. Both faculty members have a legitimate
reason to participate in the conference, independent of this study. No patient specific
information, identified information, or protected information is collected or analyzed at
any point in the study.

3.5 Near-Miss Reporting

Based on the review of the literature, for every complication or adverse event
there should be a multiple of near-miss events (latent errors). In order to capture and
track the number and types of near-miss events, an anonymous, password protected, webbased data collection system for house staff (residents) to report near-misses was
instituted. The near-miss report addressed all clinical services, not just surgery, and all
participating institutions. The primary purpose of the near-miss reporting system was to
provide anonymous reports back to the respective institutions to inform their quality
improvement processes. The web page was integrated into the house staff duty hours
documentation package used by the GME program, which was very familiar with all
residents. Residents were instructed about the availability of the near-miss reporting
system at orientation. The House Staff Association was advised of the near-miss
reporting system on three separate occasions and asked to encourage use by the residents.
Each resident received three separate e-mails advising them of the availability of the
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near-miss reporting system. All program directors were advised of the availability of the
near-miss reporting system both by e-mail and at the annual program directors’
workshop/retreat. Unfortunately, the number of near-misses actually reported was very
small. Although the information was provided to the hospital leadership, it was not used
in this study. Identifying the reasons for the poor response would be informative, but it is
beyond the scope of this study.

3.6 Preliminary (Formative) Data Review

After three months of Morbidity and Mortality reporting data had been collected,
a preliminary analysis of the data was performed to determine the most frequent types of
errors. The largest number of errors was in the error classification of “technique error.”
Since preventing and correcting these errors form the “substance” of a surgical residency
and are known to require a long time of intensive training (the surgical residency
program, accredited by the ACGME, requires sixty months of structured, formal
training), “technique error” was not considered for the focused and time-limited
simulation training used in this investigation. The next three most frequent causes of
error were selected as the basis of a limited training program: judgment error,
carelessness/inattention to detail, and incomplete understanding of the problem.

3.7 Designing the Training Program

The American College of Surgeons (ACS) provided invaluable assistance in the
development of the training program in the form of participation by the investigator in
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two formal committees: the Professionalism Committee and the Allied Health
Professions Patient Safety Subcommittee.

The investigator served on the Professionalism Committee for two years and
learned how to identify, plan, and develop video-based training tools for training
surgeons in the area of “Professionalism.” During this training, the investigator worked
with a group of nationally recognized surgical experts in identifying the components of
Professionalism, writing scripts for vignettes for each of the identified components of
Professionalism, developing the scenes, performing the taping and editing, and doing a
post-development analysis of the principles and concepts which had been addressed.
This experience formed the background for the “Taped Scenario” component of the
training program which was developed for this study. In addition, the Professionalism
Committee reviewed the scripts developed for the video component of the training.

The investigator chaired the Allied Health Professions Patient Safety
Subcommittee. This subcommittee includes individuals from a variety of healthcare
disciplines which all participate in the care of surgical patients: surgeons, an
anesthesiologist, nurse practitioners, a physician assistant, an operating room nurse
manager, surgical educators, and surgical simulation experts. This committee
participated in a series of conference calls which defined and amplified a short-term goal
and a long-term goal for the American College of Surgeons. With the approval of the
leadership of the ACS, the short term goal was to assist in the basic design of a
simulation-based training program which could serve as the prototype for the
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investigator’s independent work. The long-term goal was the development of a CD
which would include a number of video scenarios to be used in physician training.

The Subcommittee identified four clinical sites for simulation (operating room,
recovery room, emergency room, and intensive care unit). The Subcommittee also
accepted using the three types of error determined in the preliminary phase of this
investigation as the focus of the four vignettes (judgment, incomplete understanding of
the problem, carelessness/inattention to detail). The group then met at the American
College of Surgeons headquarters in Chicago and outlined potential scenarios for the four
clinical sites. Equal effort was invested in developing each of the four scenarios and
included identifying possible errors, defining the individuals who should be included in
the vignette, and addressing how each of the errors could be accomplished in a
videotaped vignette so as to be easily understood, unambiguous, and of educational
value.

3.7.1 Developing the Videotaped Scenarios. An initial script, based on error in the
operating room (Appendices 8, 9,10), was created by the investigator and further
developed and edited by the Patient Safety Subcommittee. The script was iteratively
circulated to the subcommittee by e-mail for suggestions and comment. The final script
was presented to the Professionalism Committee of the ACS for input and comment. The
Professionalism Committee was asked as expert individuals to anonymously “grade” the
final script based on the likelihood that it would be an effective training tool on a scale of
1-10.
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The finalized operating room scenario script was used to produce the videotape,
utilizing resources available to the investigator through the College of Medicine, and
utilizing faculty and students from the Department of Theater in the College of Visual
and Performing Arts at USF. The scripts were reviewed by two senior faculty members
in the Department of Theater and minor, non-substantive changes were made to enhance
the dramatic quality, based on the expertise of the faculty members. All videos were
taped on the same day and edited. The final videotape was presented to the Patient
Safety Subcommittee for input and comment. The subcommittee voted unanimously that
the videotape accurately and clearly described the three selected types of error and would
be effective as a training device.

3.7.2 Developing the Mannequin-Based Simulation Training. In addition to the
video, described above, the training module was designed to include an interactive, live
training session using a programmed physiological mannequin (“Stan”- Appendix 11).
The recovery room (Post Anesthesia Care Unit-PACU) scenario (Appendix 12)
developed in the Patient Safety Subcommittee was used as the background material for
the development of this simulation-based training module. To increase the validity of the
simulation, a series of meetings was held which included the investigator, a professor of
Industrial Organizational Psychology, Michael Brannick PhD, and two psychology
doctoral students, for the purpose of planning the training session. Professor Brannick
had previously published books and articles on the subject of training and is considered
an expert in the field. The plan was to create a doctoral research project in psychology
which would be “nested” within the training session. The collaboration in development
and validation of the training session was a critically important component of this work.
36

For the purposes of this study, however, the actual analysis of the performance of the
residents, the debriefing, and the pre-test/post-test form the basis of a separate doctoral
project , are not included as a component of this study, and do not appear in this
manuscript.

The USF Simulation Center agreed to assist in the development and
implementation of the resident training session and approved the use of the simulation
center (Center for Advanced Clinical Learning) for the actual sessions. The Center also
provided both staff and expertise in the development and implementation of the
simulation-based training. In a preliminary meeting with the director of the Center and
her staff, the content of the simulation training session was reviewed, an extensive review
of possible responses was codified, needed supplies were identified, a script was
developed (Appendix 12) and the mannequin was programmed to produce appropriate
physiological responses to the interventions anticipated to be requested by the trainees.
The 34 available surgical residents were scheduled randomly for one of two selected days
for training. Residents were scheduled to arrive at 15 minute intervals to avoid
individuals meeting and discussing the session. Each resident was allocated one hour for
the training. Three residents did not present for their assigned training session and were
rescheduled for the subsequent session. Each resident was scheduled to participate in
four fifteen minute segments: 1. the introduction, informed consent, and pre-test; 2.
watching the video (12 minutes); 3. performing the simulation-based training (15
minutes); 4. debriefing by a senior surgical faculty member (15 minutes). Six weeks
after the training session, the residents were asked to complete the open-ended test a
second time.
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3.8 Institutional Review

Consultation with the legal advisor to the University of South Florida Institutional
Review Board established that the data collection process was an extension of the
existing Morbidity and Mortality review process and not a new collection of research
data, in that it was a refinement of an ongoing process rather than collection of new
information. In addition, all data were de-identified before transfer within the server.
However, it was clear that the training session for the residents involved a protected class
of subjects, and that any information obtained from the training session would qualify as
“generalizable research.” Accordingly, the study, including the training module and the
associated evaluations, was submitted to the USF IRB and approved.

3.9 Data Analysis and Statistics

Results of surveys and templates were accumulated electronically in an Oracle
database and downloaded to an Excel spreadsheet for review and analysis. Summary
statistics were determined and multivariate comparisons were performed. Data are
expressed as mean , median, quantiles, standard deviation, and SEM. Commercial
statistical packages (MiniTab, SPSS, SAS, True Epistat) were used as appropriate to
perform Fisher’s Exact tests of frequency data, Kolmogorov Smirnov tests of normality
and of distribution comparison, linear regression, trend line analysis, and ANOVA.
Parametric statistical tests were employed only when normality testing affirmed no
significant difference from a normal distribution and examination of subsequent residuals
demonstrated the reasonableness of the assumption of normality. Conditional probability
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for individual analyses was determined by measuring the actual frequency of events in a
subgroup as a percentage of the overall frequency of group events.

3.9.1 Reliability Analysis. Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any
measuring procedure yields the same result on repeated trials. Although many studies
utilize Cronbach’s alpha or the kappa statistic to assess reliability, was selected. This is
the sum of agreement (true positive plus true negative) divided by the total number in the
subgroup at risk. They describe this as not being subject to bias and suggest a critical
value greater than 0.7 to confer “reliability” on classification/taxonomy systems. In this
study, reliability was assessed between two experts who “scored” a series of actual case
presentations, among respondents to the set of three standard scenarios, and between
aggregate data from the individual scenarios.

3.9.2 Validity Assessment. Validity refers to the degree to which a study accurately
reflects or assesses the specific concept that the researcher is attempting to measure.
External validity refers to the extent to which the results of a study are generalizable or
transferable. Internal validity refers to (1) the rigor with which the study was conducted
(e.g., the study's design, the care taken to conduct measurements, and decisions
concerning what was and wasn't measured) and (2) the extent to which the designers of a
study have taken into account alternative explanations for any causal relationships they
explore.

3.9.2.1 Face Validity. Face validity is concerned with how a measure or
procedure appears. Does it seem like a reasonable way to gain the information the
researchers are attempting to obtain? Does it seem well designed? Does it seem as though
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it will work reliably? Face validity was ascertained by demonstrating the instruments and
materials to designated groups of content experts. For the template, the group of experts
was the faculty of the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida. For the
video, the groups of experts were the Patient Safety Subcommittee of the American
College of Surgeons, the Professionalism Taskforce of the American College of
Surgeons, and the faculty of the Department of Theater at the University of South
Florida. For the simulation, the groups were the Patient Safety Subcommittee of the
American College of Surgeons, and the faculty and graduate students of the Division of
Industrial Organizational Psychology in the Department of Psychology at the University
of South Florida, and the professional simulation staff of the Office of Curriculum and
Medical Education at the University of South Florida.

3.9.2.2 Construct Validity. Construct validity seeks agreement between a
theoretical concept and a specific measuring device or procedure. Construct validity of
the template was assessed by comparing the scores of the expert surgeons evaluating the
scenarios by survey with the planned scores of the design scenarios.

3.9.2.3 Criterion Validity. Criterion related validity, also referred to as
instrumental validity, is used to demonstrate the accuracy of a measure or procedure by
comparing it with another measure or procedure which has been demonstrated to be
valid. Criterion validity for the types of error was assessed by comparing the scores in
individual components of the analysis for the individual type of error with the previously
accepted classification of error in the categories of evaluation versus execution, slip, and
mistake as defined previously. The types of errors identified throughout the study period
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consistently related to the published characteristics of errors, that is, whether they
occurred during evaluation or execution, and whether they were a slip or a mistake.

3.9.2.4. Content Validity. Content validity is based on the extent to which a
measurement reflects the specific intended domain of content. The classification system
used throughout this study is based on the prevalent taxonomies published over the past
25 years and is modified only to use language and concepts that are more familiar to
surgeons. Errors are classified into organizational/systemic, technical/mechanical, and
human factors categories, as is now widely accepted. Since neither the communication
with local and national experts nor the pilot data collection suggested that there would be
a large component of organizational or mechanical errors, these components were not
further divided into subcategories. Anticipating that human factors errors would
represent the dominant class of errors, and planning to use human factors errors in the
training program for surgeons, human factors error was subdivided into 9 categories,
reflecting the published literature in the field.

3.9.3 Data Classification Analysis. Responses to scoring templates were analyzed in 3
ways: overall descriptive analysis of all data; by grouping of four error types into a single
category (carelessness/inattention to detail, judgment, incomplete understanding, and
technical error) to estimate the previously described categories of slips and mistakes; by
grouping of three error types into a single category (carelessness/inattention to detail,
judgment, incomplete understanding) to estimate the three categories that were
specifically designed into the training instrument. In other words, data were structured
and analyzed to facilitate the comparison of data after training to baseline data, and to
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specifically address 1. overall change (all error categories), 2. slips and mistakes,
represented by the four categories listed, 3. areas of specific training, represented by the
three categories.

Regressions were performed to analyze whether number of procedures, number or
percent complications, percent complications associated with error, or percent
complications associated with index errors changed during the 12 month baseline period.
Normality of the data was affirmed by analysis of residuals. Regressions and ANOVA
were performed using MiniTab or SAS. Individual distributions were assessed for
normality by visually examining graphs of residuals and by Kolmogorov-Smirnov
testing. In addition to traditional statistical hypothesis testing, pre- and post-training data
were compared by ANOVA of linear regression. For purposes of hypothesis testing, the
null hypothesis was rejected if p<0.05 unless otherwise specified.
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4. Results

The original prototype of the scoring template of medical errors was created based
on a thorough review of the published literature on industrial error, medical error, and
surgical complications. The prototype was refined utilizing the input of internal
academic surgical colleagues and tested at the surgical Morbidity and Mortality
Conference. The list of medical errors was sent to eight external academic surgical
experts qualified by having published peer reviewed articles on the subject of patient
safety. Four experts responded to the request (50%) after two mailings. All experts
agreed with the classification system.

The case scenarios were reviewed with members of the surgical faculty, to verify
that they were realistic and that the medical error appeared to be clear and scorable using
the template. Adjustments were made to facilitate comprehension and ease of use. The
template was also reviewed by two nationally recognized experts (S.M., College of
Nursing; J.K., College of Education) in measurement and evaluation to verify that the
instrument itself was understandable, consistent, and likely to be usable for external
validation.

One hundred sixty-five scenarios and templates were sent out as described to
selected members of the Association of Academic Surgeons. A second mailing to each
individual, thanking him/her if he had completed the survey and reminding him/her if not
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yet completed, was sent 6 weeks after the first mailing.. After two mailings, 48
completed evaluations were returned completed (29% response rate).

4.1 External Template Validation

Forty-eight completed evaluations were available for analysis. The average age
of the respondents was 15.9 +/- 9.2 years post surgical residency. All respondents had
current faculty appointments in a major university and were actively involved in
academic surgery (Table 2).

Table 2. Years Since Completing Residency
Years Since
Residency

N

In Residency

3

0-5

2

6-10

9

11-15

10

16-20

7

21-25

8

26-30

4

31-35

4

36-40

0
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As designed, each of the three scenarios was intended to demonstrate a specific
type of error: Scenario 1, technical error (31) and judgment (28); Scenario 2,
carelessness/inattention to detail (25); and Scenario 3, judgment (28). In addition, each
describes a different severity of injury and contains a differing level of complexity.
Scenario 1 is straightforward with minimal impact on the patient. Scenario 2 is
complicated (multiple components but a prudent individual will identify them correctly)
and would result temporary harm to the patient. Scenario 3 is complex (multiple
components which could be analyzed in several ways) and would lead to serious harm to
the patient. The Outcome Scores for the three scenarios are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Outcome Score for the Three Scenarios
Patient outcome reported by surgeon experts for three clinical scenarios.
Scenario

Scenario

Scenario

1

2

3

Outcome

Outcome Definition

ID

#

%

#

%

#

%

1

15

34.1

1

0.0

0

0.0

2

23

52.3

8

16.0

0

0.0

3

6

13.6

39

78.0

19

44.2

disability

4

0

0.0

2

4.0

24

55.8

Death

5

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

No injury or delay
No injury but increased
length of Stay (LOS)
Injury with temporary
disability
Injury with permanent
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If the sum of Outcome Scores 3+4+5 is considered to represent serious adverse
outcomes (National Association of Insurance Adjustors criteria), then 14% of responders
scored Scenario 1 as having a serious adverse outcome, 82% scored Scenario 2 as having
a serious adverse outcome, and 100% scored Scenario 3 as leading to a serious adverse
outcome. This confirms the ability of the scoring system to distinguish the severity of the
error. This is particularly noteworthy since none of the patients died in the scenarios,
eliminating “death” as an outcome score. The weighted score for Scenario 1 is 1.8,
Scenario 2, 2.9, and Scenario 3, 3.6. This estimate of the impact of the events in the
scenario on patient outcome seems to be appropriate in that the patient in Scenario 1
might have slight prolongation in length of stay (outcome score less than 2); the patient in
Scenario 2 would have some disability which might be temporary (outcome score
approximately 3); and the patient in Scenario 3 would be expected to have a very
prolonged hospitalization with multiple complications, probably requiring subsequent
surgical procedures (outcome score near 4). The scoring template appears to capture the
impact of the error on patient outcome realistically. Listed in Table 4 is the summary
information on error occurrence for the three scenarios.
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Table 4. Agreement in Error Classification in the Scenarios
Weighted

Wt. %

Score

% Error

% Eval

%Exec

Both

Slip

Mistake

Impact

Scenario 1

1.8

77%

8.1%

92.0%

0.0%

93.5%

6.5%

65.8%

Scenario 2

2.9

98%

2.2%

93.3%

4.4%

41.2%

58.8%

83.9%

Scenario 3

3.6

79%

50.0%

44.1%

5.9%

42.9%

57.1%

58.0%

By design, each of the scenarios represented an error. In the experience of the
author, many surgeons interpret a surgical consequence that is difficult to avoid to be
“unavoidable” and thus perhaps not due to error. An injury to the intestine during an
operation is a case in point. While it is an error, in the sense that it is an unintended
consequence which could have been avoided, in scenario 1 approximately 25% of
surgeons did not identify the intestinal injury as an error. Similarly, 21% of surgeons did
not identify an error in Scenario 3, while fully 98% identified an error in Scenario 2.
Scenario 1 and scenario 2 represent strictly technical “failures” and as would be
expected, greater than 90% of responders identified an error occurring during execution.
Scenario 3 was identified by half of surgeons as an error during evaluation and half as an
error during execution. This very complex case contains elements of both types of error.
The template fails to be able to resolve this dilemma in the simple binary choice of
evaluation or execution. This complexity is more readily apparent in the more detail
analysis of specific error types presented and discussed later. In Scenario 1, the surgeons
uniformly identified the error as a slip (the correct action done incorrectly). In Scenarios
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2 and 3 there was an almost even assignment to slip and mistake, even when the error
was clearly identified as occurring during execution as in Scenario 2.

The more detailed analysis of the types of error provided by the broader error
classification scheme in the template is demonstrated in Table 5 and graphically depicted
in Figure 1.
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H is to g ra m

( S c e n a rio

1 )

o f T y p e
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2 5

Frequency

2 0

1 5

1 0

5

0

2 2

2 4

2 6
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3 2

3 4

3 6
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0
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2 8
T y p e o f E rro r (1 )
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Figure 1. Error Types Identified in Scenarios
The bars indicate the frequency that specific errors were identified for each of the three
validation scenarios.
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Table 5. Characterization of Error Types in Validation Scenarios
For each scenario, the percentage of expert responses identifying the primary source of
error.
Error Types

Error ID

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Equipment/Mechanical

21

0%

0%

0%

Organizational error

22

0%

0%

0%

23

13%

0%

15%

24

5%

0%

0%

detail

25

13%

67%

0%

Error in diagnosis

26

0%

0%

3%

Communication error

27

0%

0%

0%

Judgment error

28

3%

2%

46%

Delay error

29

0%

0%

0%

Error of omission

30

0%

0%

0%

Technique error

31

66%

31%

36%

Incomplete understanding
Failure to use protocol
Carelessness/inattention to

This table only includes the primary error identified for each scenario. The
numbers in bold identify the major errors identified by the surgeons for each scenario.
For Scenario 1, most responders felt that this was a technical problem, although
approximately 25% identified the error as either incomplete understanding or
carelessness/inattention to detail. In Scenario 2, 67% identified the error as
carelessness/inattention to detail, although almost one third saw this as an error in
technique. Similarly, in Scenario 3, almost 50% recognized a judgment error, yet a third
felt that this was a technique error. This information for Scenario 2 and Scenario 3
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provides a better description of the error than the simple classification into slip or
mistake, which would appear to be “confounding” the combination of more than one
error.

Table 6. Characterization of All Errors Listed in Validation Scenarios
For each scenario, the distribution of all errors reported by experts.
Error Description
Equipment/Mechanical
Organizational error
Incomplete understanding
Failure to use protocol
Carelessness/inattention
to detail
Error in diagnosis
Communication error
Judgment error
Delay error
Error of omission
Technique error

Error
ID

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

21
22
23
24

0%
0%
10%
7%

2%
0%
6%
5%

0%
0%
18%
2%

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

27%
0%
0%
11%
0%
0%
45%

39%
1%
1%
10%
3%
3%
30%

8%
16%
0%
30%
0%
0%
26%

Table 6 includes all errors identified by the surgeons for each of the three
scenarios. In this analysis, there is no attempt to reconcile the order of the errors (which
will be addressed below). Although technique is identified by 46% in scenario 1, this is
less than when only the primary error is considered, thus allowing a greater appreciation
of the cognitive or planning error that was designed into the scenario. Scenario 2 is
actually made more confusing by considering all listed errors without weighting,
decreasing the “carelessness/inattention to detail” from 66% to 39% and introducing a
variety of additional errors (equipment/mechanical, incomplete understanding, failure to
use protocol, error in diagnosis, communication error, judgment error, delay error, and
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error omission). This would not appear to be helpful. Scenario 3, an even more
complicated clinical situation, is similarly more diffuse when all errors are considered.
When the data are combined into a tabular form and apply weighting for the location of
the error types in the individual surgeon’s list (Table 7), the major error is more clearly
accentuated and yet the associated error types are also clear.
Table 7. Scenario Data Analysis Weighted by Position in List
Case 1
Weight = 1
Weight = 2
Weight = 3
Weight = 4
Weight = 5
Sum
Weighted
sum
Weighted
ave
Case 2
Weight = 1
Weight = 2
Weight = 3
Weight = 4
Weight = 5
Sum
Weighted
sum
Weighted
ave
Case 3
Weight = 1
Weight = 2
Weight = 3
Weight = 4
eight = 5
Sum
Weighted
sum
Weighted
ave

List
5th
4th
3rd
2nd
1st

5th
4th
3rd
2nd
1st

5th
4th
3rd
2nd
1st

E21
0
0
0
0
0
0

E22
0
0
0
0
0
0

E23
0
0
0
2
4
6

E24
0
0
1
2
2
5

E25
0
0
4
12
5
21

E26
0
0
0
0
0
0

E27
0
0
0
0
0
0

E28
0
0
4
4
0
8

E29
0
0
0
0
0
0

E30
0
0
0
0
0
0

E31
0
1
2
3
27
33

0

0

28

21

85

0

0

28

0

0

155

0

0

1.87

1.40

5.67

0.00

0.00

1.87

0.00

0.00

10.3

E21
0
1
0
0
0
1

E22
0
0
0
0
0
0

E23
2
3
1
1
0
7

E24
1
0
2
3
1
7

E25
0
0
2
12
28
42

E26
0
0
1
0
1
2

E27
0
0
1
0
0
1

E28
0
2
6
3
1
12

E29
0
0
2
2
0
4

E30
0
1
2
0
0
3

E31
0
1
3
13
16
33

2

0

15

24

194

8

3

39

14

8

143

0.13

0.00

1.00

1.60

12.9

0.53

0.20

2.60

0.93

0.53

9.53

E21
0
0
0
0
0
0

E22
0
0
0
0
0
0

E23
0
0
3
7
5
15

E24
0
1
0
1
0
2

E25
1
0
4
3
0
8

E26
0
1
2
11
2
16

E27
0
0
0
0
0
0

E28
0
0
5
2
19
26

E29
0
0
0
0
0
0

E30
0
0
0
0
0
0

E31
0
2
3
5
14
24

0

0

62

6

25

62

0

118

0

0

103

0

0

4.1

0.4

1.7

4.1

0

7.9

0

0

6.9
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Scenario 1 is clearly identified as technical error, yet carelessness /inattention to detail
(and to a lesser extent incomplete understanding of the problem and judgment error) are
also recognized. Scenario 2 is recognized as principally carelessness/inattention to detail
and a technical error. Scenario 3 is a judgment error and a technical error, but also
identified is the fact that there is perhaps an error in diagnosis. Although the total
number of respondents is relatively small (N=45), the analysis of the data would suggest
that the classification system can provide both a valid and a rich understanding of the
errors.

Twelve completed scenarios were submitted by faculty and residents at the
investigator’s institution (University of South Florida) and were also analyzed
independently to determine if reliability and validity within the study institution was
greater than of the sample as a whole. Since the individuals within the investigator’s
institution had the greatest familiarity with the instrument, it might be anticipated that this
group would more consistently use the scoring template to evaluate error (reliability and
validity). The average number of years since residency for this group (8.1 +/- 2.0 years)
is significantly less than for the other respondents (15.9 +/- 1.3 years) or the total group
(18.3 +/- 1.4 years). p<0.05 for both comparisons. This is in part due to the inclusion of
3 residents in this group (there were no residents from any other institution), yet the
difference is still significant (P=0.05) if the residents are excluded. The analysis of this
subgroup, which is perhaps more indicative of the group that participated in the actual
patient error reporting (to be reported below), is considerably more homogeneous than
the larger group as a whole. For Scenario 1, 82% of respondents identified an error, all
noted it occurred during execution, as a slip. For Scenario 2, 100% identified the action
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as an error during execution, and a slip. For Scenario 3, 73% identified an error; half
placed it in evaluation (and all noted a mistake) and half in execution (and all noted a
slip). The outcome scores were, respectively, 1.7, 3.1, 3.2 with Scenario 2 slightly but
not significantly higher than the total group, and Scenario 3 slightly lower than the total
group but not significantly.

4.2 Internal Comparison

Seventy-two patient presentations were scored by each of two senior surgical
faculty members over a 12 month period. Cases were selected for presentation in the
conference by the surgical residency program director independently, without regard to
the study. Cases were only scored when both faculty were present at the same Mordidity
and Mortality Conference to evaluate the same case presentation. This methodology,
while not random, is unbiased.

Both evaluators agreed on the presence or absence of error in 59 of the 72 cases
(reliability = 0.83). By Fisher’s Exact Test, the probability was 0.41 (NS). The
agreement between the two evaluators and the breakdown of outcome scores are
indicated below in Tables 8 and 9.
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Table 8. Agreement Between the Two Evaluators
Evaluator 2 No

Evaluator 2 Yes

Evaluator 1 No

24

9

Evaluator 1 Yes

3

36
Reliability = 0.83
Exact-P=.4097

Table 9. Internal Evaluator Outcome Scores
Outcome was scored on a 1-5 scale.
SCORE

Description

Evaluator 1

Evaluator 2

No adverse effect on
1

outcome

2

0.03

7

0.10

13

0.18

14

0.19

33

0.46

27

0.38

5

0.07

5

0.07

19

0.26

19

0.26

No injury but increased
2

length of stay
Injury with temporary

3

disability
Injury with permanent

4

disability

5

Death

Weighted score

3.36

Weighted score

3.21

Graphically, the outcome scores of the two evaluators demonstrate a high degree of
agreement (Figure 2).
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Evaluator 2

Score
6
4
2
0
0

2

4

6

Evaluator 1

Figure 2. Comparison of Error Scores (1-5) Between Evaluators 1 and 2

The outcome scores of the two evaluators were compared by linear regression and
ANOVA. There was a very high agreement between the evaluators:

Score #2= 0.99970 (Score #1) - 0.1518 ( p<0.0001)

Correlation analysis demonstrated r= .88 and ANOVA demonstrated an adjusted Rsquared = 0.77. Analysis of residuals (Figure 3) showed no evidence of non-normality or
unequal variance. KS analysis for Evaluator 1 demonstrated mean outcome score = 3.36,
SD 1.14, median 3, KS=0.069 (p>.15); for Evaluator 2 mean outcome score=3.208,
SD=1.30, median 3, KS=0.055 (p>.15). Using the KS test to compare the two
distributions of scores p>.99.

Scores were also compared by Fleiss Kappa statistic and

no difference was detected in any of the five outcome score levels. There does not
appear to be a significant difference between the scoring processes of the two evaluators.
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Residual Plots for error
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Residual Plots for % index error
Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals

Residuals Versus the Fitted Values

99
0.2
Residual

Percent

90
50

0.1
0.0
-0.1

10
1
-0.30

-0.2
-0.15

0.00
Residual

0.15

0.30

0.400

Histogram of the Residuals

0.500

0.2

3

Residual

Frequency

0.450
0.475
Fitted Value

Residuals Versus the Order of the Data

4

2

0.1
0.0
-0.1

1
0

0.425

-0.2
-0.18 -0.12 -0.06 0.00

0.06

Residual

0.12 0.18

0.24

1

2

3

4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Observation Order

Figure 3. Residual Analysis of Error and Index Error
Residuals were calculated for the trend analysis of total error and index error over time
for the entire study period.

The assessments of the two evaluators were compared as to whether they believed
the error occurred during evaluation or execution. Previous studies have separated errors
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that occurred during evaluation (planning) from those occurring during execution. This
generally corresponds to the distinction between mistakes (planning) and slips
(execution). The evaluators identified very few cases where error had occurred during
evaluation (Evaluator 1 in 6, Evaluator 2 in 4) making the analysis of errors during
evaluation “trivial.”

In those cases where the two evaluators agreed on the presence of

error (N=36), both evaluators agreed that the error occurred during execution in 27/28
opportunities but only agreed in 50% that the error occurred during evaluation in the
remaining cases. This could have been confounded by the use of the term evaluation
instead of planning, as the missing cases leading to lack of agreement were usually not
scored in this category. Both evaluators therefore consistently agreed on the presence of
errors of execution and likely agreed similarly on the presence of errors of evaluation/
planning.

The assessment of the two evaluators as to whether the error was a slip or a
mistake was evaluated in the 36 cases where the evaluators agreed that an error had
occurred. The evaluators demonstrated a significant agreement regarding the occurrence
of a slip versus a mistake. In 31 cases where the error had occurred during execution,
Evaluator 1 identified a slip in 25 and Evaluator 2 in 26. The evaluators identified very
few errors occurring during evaluation. However, of the 6 errors during evaluation which
were identified by Evaluator 1, one was classed as a mistake and not classified in the
other 5. Evaluator 2 identified a mistake in 3 and a slip in 1, in the 4 evaluation errors
identified. This is not entirely conclusive because in 5 cases neither a slip nor a mistake
was coded. These data indicate a high reliability in identifying the presence of a mistake
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in errors of evaluation and of a slip in errors of execution, demonstrating internal
consistency in the evaluation template scoring.

The primary error type for the two evaluators is categorized in Table 10.

Table 10. Distribution of Error Types in Inter-rater Comparison
Eval 1

Eval 2

Error ID

Frequency

Frequency

Error Definition

21

1

1

equipment/mechanical failure

22

1

0

organizational error

23

1

9

incomplete understanding

24

3

2

failure to use protocol
carelessness/carelessness/inattention to

25

11

8

detail

26

1

1

error in diagnosis

27

1

3

communication error

28

2

2

judgment error

29

1

1

delay error

30

0

0

error of omission

31

17

18

technique error

Graphically, Evaluator 2 was more likely to identify that there was incomplete
understanding of the problem, whereas Evaluator 1 was more likely to identify
carelessness/carelessness/inattention to detail.
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Interrater Comparison of Error Type
20
15
#1 freq
#2 freq

10
5
0
21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

Error Type

Figure 4. Graphical Comparison of Errors Identified by Internal Raters

The evaluators agreed on the exact primary error type in 64% or 23/36 cases
(Figure 4). The agreement was very high when all error types listed for a case were
compared between the two investigators, specifically identifying the likelihood that the
first error type was one of the four types which corresponded with the previously
described categories of slip and mistake (Error ID 23,25,28,31). The evaluators agreed in
92% or 33/36 cases in which an error had occurred that the primary error was one of
these four. The specific training was designed to address three of these four, incomplete
understanding, carelessness/carelessness/inattention to detail, and judgment, and was not
specifically designed to address error in technique. When the three error types (23,25,28)
were compared between the two evaluators, there was agreement in 72%.
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4.3 Video Evaluation

4.3.1 Video Script Review. Thirteen nationally recognized medical educators, all
members of the Professionalism Task Force of the American College of Surgeons,
reviewed the script and responded to the question “How likely is this process to be an
effective means of training residents in the area of medical error?” They were instructed
to write down (anonymous) a score from 1-10. The average score was 8.5 (p<0.05) with
a standard error of the mean of 0.26 (95% confidence interval 7.9-9.0)

4.3.2 Video Review. The completed video was demonstrated to the Committee on Allied
Health Professionals of the American College of Surgeons at the Annual Clinical
Congress of the American College of Surgeons. Ten nationally respected academic
surgeons and two non-physician surgical educators participated. The members were
asked to provide feedback and criticism. The committee voted unanimously to endorse
the video as a valid training instrument, with a high likelihood of being effective in
training surgical residents in the area of medical error.

4.4 Analysis of Baseline Error Data

For 3 months, morbidity and mortality templates were reviewed by the
investigator to assure that the “system” was functioning, the data were being stored in a
complete and retrievable manner, and that the residents were completing the assessments
appropriately.
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After the initial 3 months of preliminary data collection, data were collected
automatically using the electronic template. A preliminary analysis of the data to
determine the most frequent types of error was conducted at the 6-month time point.

The monthly error incidence is shown in Figure 5. The most common type of
error in the preliminary analysis was technical, followed by judgment error,
carelessness/inattention to detail, and incomplete understanding. This preliminary
analysis was used to determine the material to be developed in the simulation training.
The analysis was repeated at the conclusion of twelve months and demonstrated the same
distribution of errors.

Number of Errors per Month
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Figure 5 . Graph of Number of Errors Per Month During Baseline

Over the subsequent 12 months, all reported complications were scored using the
electronic template. During the 12 month baseline analysis period, 9830 surgical cases
were performed and available for analysis. A total of 332 complications were reported
(3.4% reported complication rate) and an error was reported to be associated in 79% of
the reported complications (Table 11). These values are consistent with data reported in
the surgical literature.
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Table 11. Monthly Procedures, Complications, and Errors During Baseline Period

Procedures

Complications

Errors

Error %

Month
#

#

#

%

Nov-05

798

10

9

90.0

Dec-05

767

42

38

90.5

Jan-06

927

10

8

80.0

Feb-06

761

25

21

84.0

Mar-06

811

26

21

80.8

Apr-06

748

26

16

61.5

May-06

929

41

32

78.0

Jun-06

709

27

22

81.5

Jul-06

822

20

17

85.0

Aug-06

902

34

28

82.4

Sep-06

857

22

18

81.8

Oct-06

799

26

14

53.8

9830

309

244

79.0

Total – 12 month
% Complications

3.1%

Error Rate per
Complication

79.0%

The distribution of type of error is shown in Figure 6. The error was due to a slip
in 58% and a mistake in 20%. The most common type of error was “technical error,”
reported in 63.5% of errors. Judgment errors were reported in 29.6%,
carelessness/inattention to detail in 29.3%, and incomplete understanding in 22.7%.
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Since more than one type of error could be reported, the total is greater than 100%. This
breakdown of errors was used for the development of the training program.

Histogram of ERRORID
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Frequency
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28

30

Figure 6. Frequency Distribution of Error Types During Baseline Period

The average outcome score was 2.76, and was distributed thus: no adverse effect
in 3.6%, prolongation of hospitalization but no patient injury in 34.4%, definite but nonpermanent disability in 25.1%, permanent disability in 8.4%, and death in 16.0%. Using
a definition for serious error as the sum of 3+4+5 outcome scores yields a serious error
rate in the baseline period of 49.5%. The outcome score was not different (MannWhitney test) in the presence or absence of an error. Patient outcome by month was
analyzed by linear regression, and there was no significant change in the number of
complications per month or the percent complications per month.

Number = 22.5 complications + 0.341/month (p=0.65)
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The percentage of complications associated with a reported error decreased over the
twelve month period.

Percent Error = 92% -1.5%/month; p= 0.051

The percentage of cases for which an index error was reported did not change
significantly over the period.

% index error= 54% - 0.96%/month; p=.33

Table 12 demonstrates the conditional probabilities that a specific error type was reported
given that the error was reported as having occurred during evaluation or execution, and
given that it was reported as a slip or as a mistake. Error Types 23, 26, and 28
(incomplete understanding, error in diagnosis, judgment error) were most likely to have
been reported as occurring during evaluation. Error types 25 and 31
(carelessness/inattention to detail, technique error) were most likely to have been reported
as occurring during execution.
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Table 12. Analysis of Characteristics of Individual Error Types
Conditional Probability of Error Type given Error Characteristics (Evaluation versus Execution and
Slip versus Mistake).

Error Type
Eval &
Exec
N=257

E21

E22

E23

E24

E25

E26

E27

E28

E29

E30

E31

0.05
0.00
0.05
0.03
0.08

0.02
0.11
0.00
0.03
0.04

0.07
0.11
0.04
0.08
0.15

0.02
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.04

0.16
0.22
0.18
0.08
0.13

0.05
0.22
0.03
0.15
0.04

0.02
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.04

0.12
0.00
0.07
0.40
0.10

0.02
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.04

Eval only
N=57

Tot Err%
Both
Slip
Mistake
Neither

0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06

0.04
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.06

0.26
0.33
0.31
0.15
0.33

0.05
0.00
0.13
0.00
0.06

0.07
0.00
0.06
0.05
0.11

0.23
0.67
0.19
0.30
0.11

0.04
0.00
0.06
0.05
0.00

0.23
0.00
0.19
0.35
0.17

0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06

Exec only
N=190

Tot Err%
Both
Slip
Mistake
Neither

0.06
0.00
0.06
0.05
0.10

0.01
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.03

0.02
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.07

0.02
0.00
0.01
0.05
0.03

0.19
0.33
0.20
0.11
0.17

0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00

0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03

0.09
0.00
0.06
0.42
0.07

0.02
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.03

Neither
N=10

Tot Err%
Both
Slip
Mistake
Neither

0.20

0.10

0.70

0.25
0.00
0.20

0.00
1.00
0.00

0.75
0.00
0.80
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Tot Err%
Both
Slip
Mistake
Neither

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00

0.46
0.33
0.58
0.18
0.35
0.05
0.00
0.06
0.05
0.06

0.01
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.00

0.57
0.50
0.64
0.32
0.45

4.5 Development and Validation of Training Program

Initial data evaluation suggested that, after errors in technique, the most common
types of errors reported were errors of incomplete understanding of the problem,
judgment, and carelessness/inattention to detail. In order to maximize the likelihood of
identifying an effect of training in altering error, these three specific errors were selected
as the focus of the training program.

The American College of Surgeons agreed to create a subcommittee, The Patient
Safety Subcommittee, of the Committee on Allied Health Professionals. This
subcommittee met by conference call on three separate occasions of an hour each, and
conference summaries were submitted to participants to inform the next conference call.
The Subcommittee then met physically at the American College of Surgeons
headquarters in Chicago for two days to “brainstorm” the development of the training
program. The author chaired both the conference calls and the in-person meeting. An
initial draft of the ideas generated was circulated to the members for agreement. Four
potential scenarios were developed in the brainstorming process, which included the 3
index errors (incomplete understanding, judgment, carelessness/inattention to detail), and
which would be enacted respectively in the operating room, recovery room, emergency
room, and surgical intensive care unit.

Two of these, the operating room and the recovery room, were selected for use in
the simulation-based training session. The operating room scenario was selected to be
scripted, acted, and videotaped. The recovery room scenario was selected to be used in
the mannequin based, hands on training session. The script of the operating room
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scenario was sent to the members of the Patient Safety Committee for editing and
comments. After two iterations, the script was reviewed by a senior faculty member in
the Department of Psychology and by a senior faculty member in the Department of
Theater.

The script was distributed at a face to face meeting of the American College of
Surgeons Professionalism Task Force. This group was selected because it had already
created and finalized 14 videotaped scenarios for the purposes of training surgeons and
surgical residents. The Committee (14 members) was composed of medical experts in
the fields of Surgery, Orthopedic Surgery, Internal Medicine, and Medical Education.
Each member was given a copy of the draft script and was asked to comment and to vote
on a scale of 1-10 on how likely the script would be effective as a training tool. The
committee score for the expected efficacy of the video was 8.5 +/- 0.26SEM, with a
minimum of 7, maximum of 10, and median of 8.

Preparing the videotape. The final script was given to two senior faculty
members in the Department of Theater at the University of South Florida. They recruited
an additional faculty member and six senior undergraduate students, who volunteered to
act in the scenario. The Tampa VA hospital approved using an empty operating room on
a Saturday afternoon. The Media Center of the University of South Florida College of
Medicine agreed to loan a professional, digital videocamera. A photographer volunteered
to operate the camera at the video shoot. Cue cards were prepared for the various
components of the scenario. The scenario consisted of four discrete components
(Appendix 8), an introduction, an operating room scene which included the three index
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errors, a roundtable discussion of a moderator and three surgeon actors, and a repeat of
the operating room scene with the errors corrected. The Media Center at USF performed
editing of the final video. The videotape was demonstrated to the Committee on Allied
Health Professionals of the American College of Surgeons at the Annual Clinical
Congress. The committee voted unanimously that the video was representative of the
three index errors and that it was highly likely to be effective as a training tool.

The Hybrid Simulation Training Session. The Director of the Center for
Advanced Clinical Learning at the University of South Florida College of Medicine
agreed to provide staff assistance and the use of the patient simulation center for the
training sessions. The facilities included an examination room prepared as a recovery
room, a trained nurse practitioner, remote cameras with a camera/audio operator, two
additional nurses, and two senior surgeons. Thirty-four residents were each scheduled for
one hour of training. A senior faculty member and two doctoral students from the
Department of Psychology observed the training sessions and administered a survey
examination to the residents regarding the training session. Each resident participated in
four discrete phases: introduction/consent/pre-test; watching the 12 minute video;
performing the mannequin-based recovery room scenario; and a one-on-one debriefing
session with one of the two senior surgeons who had remotely observed the training
session. Each participating resident repeated the survey test six weeks after the training
session.
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4.6 Post-Training Data Analysis

Post-training data were collected over a 6-month period in an identical manner as
in the pre-training period. Data are depicted in 6-month blocks to facilitate comparison
(Table 13). The first 2 periods are also combined as the pre-training period. Comparison
between the 6 months immediately preceding training to the 6 months following training
was used to have more equal population sizes, and the comparison was made using
Fisher’s Exact Test.

Data were also analyzed by regression analysis over the entire 18 month time
period (based on the null hypothesis that there was no effect of the training). There was
no difference between number of patients treated per month before and after training,
either by Fisher’s Exact test or by regression (P=.35).

Data are presented by month for the entire 18 month study period in Table 14.
The table demonstrates procedures, complications, % complications, error, errors as
percent of complications, errors as percent of procedures, primary index errors, any index
errors listed, primary index as percent of procedures, any index as percent of procedures,
primary index as percent of complications, and any index as percent of complications.
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19.0
18.0
18.5
13.2
16.7

74.2
69.3
71.7
72.3
71.9

2.4
2.2
2.3
1.6
2.0

6.2
8.0
7.1
5.0
6.4

10.5
12.0
11.3
7.7
10.1

Index/P
%

Total
Index#/mo

Primary
Index
#/mo

E/P
%

E/C
%

Errors
#/mo

Comps
%
3.2%
3.1%
3.2%
2.1%
2.8%

0.8
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.8

Any
Index/C
%

26.0
26.2
26.1
18.0
23.4

Primary
Index/C
%

802
836
819
847
829

Total
Index/P
%
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First 6 mo.
Second 6 mo.
First Year
Third 6 mo.
Total Period

Comps
#/mo

Procedures
#/mo.

Table 13. Analysis of Error Data by 6-Month Blocks
Results for number and type of errors for each 6-month period. The first two periods comprise the base year. The third block is after
training. The total period includes all 18 months. (P= Procedures; C=Comps=Complications; E=Errors).

1.3
1.4
1.4
0.9
1.2

23.9
32.2
28.1
27.4
27.9

40.8
46.5
43.6
41.5
42.9

Primary
Index/P
%

Total
Index/P
%

Primary
Index/C
%

Total
Index/C
%

71.5%

2.0%

6.39

10

0.8%

1.2%

27.9%

42.9%

42
10
25
26
27
26
27
20
32
24
26
28
22
16
18
20
16
16
421

5.3
1.3
2.7
3.4
3.3
3.5
2.9
2.8
3.9
2.7
3.0
3.5
2.4
2.3
2.1
2.4
1.8
1.8

29
8
20
21
22
14
22
15
21
19
14
17
19
12
13
15
11
9
301

69.0
80.0
80.0
80.8
81.5
53.8
81.5
75.0
65.6
79.2
53.8
60.7
86.4
75.0
72.2
75.0
68.8
56.3

3.6
1.0
2.2
2.8
2.7
1.9
2.4
2.1
2.6
2.1
1.6
2.1
2.0
1.8
1.5
1.8
1.2
1.0

8
2
7
8
3
9
13
10
4
10
6
5
7
3
5
6
3
6

2.8%

Total Index
#/mo

47.6
50.0
40.0
34.6
18.5
53.8
63.0
55.0
37.5
50.0
30.8
42.9
59.1
31.3
38.9
45.0
25.0
50.0

Primary
Index
#/mo

19.0
20.0
28.0
30.8
11.1
34.6
48.1
50.0
12.5
41.7
23.1
17.9
31.8
18.8
27.8
30.0
18.8
37.5

E/P
%

2.5
0.7
1.1
1.2
0.6
1.9
1.8
1.6
1.5
1.3
0.9
1.5
1.4
0.7
0.8
1.1
0.4
0.9

E/C
%

1.0
0.3
0.8
1.1
0.4
1.2
1.4
1.4
0.5
1.1
0.7
0.6
0.7
0.4
0.6
0.7
0.3
0.7

Errors
#/mo

20
5
10
9
5
14
17
11
12
12
8
12
13
5
7
9
4
8

Comps
%

798
767
927
761
811
748
929
709
822
902
857
799
935
683
851
826
900
888
14913

Comps
#/mo
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Month
Nov-05
Dec-05
Jan-06
Feb-06
Mar-06
Apr-06
May-06
Jun-06
Jul-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Oct-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
Jan-07
Feb-07
Mar-07
Apr-07
SUM
AVERAGE

Procedures
#/mo

Table 14. Analysis of Morbidity and Mortality Data by Month Over 18-Month Study Period
P=Procedures; C=Comps=Complications; E=Errors.

There was no difference in the number of errors, the number of primary index errors, or
total index errors by Fisher’s Exact Test between the 6 month pre and post-training
periods. However, there was a significant regression with a decrease in the number and
percent of complications and the number and percent of errors, which spanned the entire
18 month period (Table 15).

Visual evaluation of the graphical data suggests that the decreases began before
the training and continued in a linear fashion after the training. Specifically, there was no
abrupt discontinuity in the data following the training. Of more interest is the
observation that there was no difference in the percent of Index Errors following training
either by Fisher’s Exact Test or by regression. In fact, it would appear that there was
either no decrease or an actual increase in the index errors following training. Data are
graphically depicted in Figure 7, Surgical Procedures by Month and Monthly
Complications and Errors; Figure 8, Errors as Percent of Procedures and Percent of
Complications; Figure 9, Primary and Total Index Error by Procedure; and Figure 10,
Primary and Total Index Error by Complication.
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Table 15. Regression Analysis of Principle Components Over Time
Regressions were performed over the 18-month study period. The number of procedures remained constant while the complication
rate and error rate fell. The error rate per complication was stable, and the rate of index errors did not change over the study period.
(P=Procedures; C=Complications; E=Errors; p = Probability).
Value per Month
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Procedures (P)
Complications (C)
Complications %
Errors (E)
E/C %
E/P %
Primary Index Errors
Total Index Error
Primary Index Error/P %
Total Index Error/P %
Primary Index Error/C %
Total Index Error/C %

Mean
828.5
23.4
2.8%
16.7
71.9%
2.0%
6.4
10.01
0.72%
1.2%
27.9%
42.9%

SEM
18
1.7
0.22
1.26
2.4
0.16
0.69
1.02
0.11
0.12
2.68
2.82

SD
76.3
7.23
0.92
5.37
10.2
0.66
2.93
4.32
0.46
0.53
11.4
12

Min
683
10
1.3
8
53.8
1
2
4
0
0.4
11.1
18.5

Median
824
24.5
2.75
16
75
2.05
6
9.5
1
1.15
27.9
43.95

Max
935
42
5.3
29
86.4
3.6
13
20
1
2.5
50
63

Skewness
-0.26
0.61
0.88
0.36
-0.65
0.47
0.5
0.63
-1.08
0.68
0.49
-0.31

Kurtosis
-0.83
1.56
1.86
0.06
-0.74
0.65
-0.08
0.22
-0.94
0.48
-0.49
-0.41

Slope
3.34
-0.637
-0.00087
-0.55
-0.00545
-0.00074
-0.129
-0.304
0.00001
-0.00044
0.00141
-0.00238

Intercept
797
29.4
0.037
21.9
0.771
0.022
7.61
12.9
0.0071
0.016
0.265
0.452

ANOVA
Prob. (p)
0.351
0.049
0.032
0.019
0.252
0.009
0.348
0.124
0.962
0.067
0.794
0.675
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Figure 7. Surgical Procedures, Complications, and Errors by Month
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Figure 8. Errors as Percent of Procedures and Percent of Complications
The percentage of procedures associated with a reported error (upper) and the percentage
of complications reported to have been associated with an error (lower).
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Figure 9. Index Error as Percent of Procedures
The percentage of procedures associated with an index error reported as the primary error
(upper) and the percentage of procedures reported with any index error (lower).

77

Primary Index Error per Complication
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Figure 10. Index Error as Percent of Complications
The percentage of reported complications with an index error as the primary error (upper)
and the percentage of reported complications with any reported index error (lower).
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There was no difference in the overall distribution of outcomes (Table 16) and no
difference between the likelihood of “serious error” (Outcome Scores 3+4+5).

Table 16 . The Outcome Scores Before and After Training
Outcome
Outcome

Score
5

Death

4

Disability

3

Pre-Training

Post-Training

16%

17%

9%

9%

Temp Disability

25%

22%

2

Prolonged

35%

38%

1

No Adverse Effect

15%

13%

The distribution of the impact of the error on the outcome (what percentage of the
complication was due to the medical error in 25% increments) was compared before and
after training by Kolmogorov Smirnov testing. There was no difference in the
distribution of impact (pre-mean =63.0% impact, SD 29.2; post-mean=63.8% impact, SD
31.0; KS= .82).

Trendlines (Figure 11) were developed to assess the data over the 18 month study
timeline. Significant trends were identified across the entire study period and
demonstrated a progressive decrease in complication rate and error rate. The level of
surgical activity was constant over the entire 18 months. Analysis of the complication
rate by month for the 12 month period immediately preceding the initiation of the study
showed a very consistent complication rate with no evidence of decrease over time.
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Trend lines did not demonstrate a decrease in the percentage of errors attributable to the
first index error reported (primary index error) or any index error reported (any error).
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Trend Analysis Plot for %comps
Linear Trend Model
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Trend Analysis Plot for %E/N
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Trend Analysis Plot for index/N
Linear Trend Model
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Figure 11. Trend Analysis for Complications, Errors, Index Errors
Trend lines over the entire 18-month study period for monthly complication rate, monthly
error rate, monthly index error rate, percent of complications with a primary index error,
and percent of complications with any index error.

81

Trend Analysis Plot for index/C
Linear Trend Model
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Trend Analysis Plot for any/C
Linear Trend Model
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0.8

Variable
Actual
Fits

0.7

Accuracy Measures
MAPE 36.2309
MAD
0.1238
MSD
0.0224

any/C

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
2

4

6

8

10
Index

12

14

16

Figure 11. (Continued)
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5. Discussion

Since the publication of “To Err is Human,” now almost 8 years ago, there has
been a plethora of studies and articles relating to the subject of medical error. More
importantly, there has been a groundswell of interest in the development of programs to
train individuals and teams to minimize error112-114. However, there have been very few
studies which actually look at patient outcomes in measuring whether the program is
effective, and even fewer studies which define a rigorous methodology with validation
and reliability testing. This is particularly true in surgery, where there have been no
published studies which actually measure the impact of medical error on surgical patient
outcome. This study has attempted to present a methodology to develop and validate a
classification system for error, develop a training program designed to address the most
common types of errors, and then measure whether the training program improved
patient outcomes over the time period following the training.

5.1 Analysis of Results

It appears quite clear that the study as a whole resulted in a sizable decrease in
medical errors, no matter how this was quantitatively expressed. There were fewer
complications, both in absolute number and as a percentage of procedures performed.
There were fewer errors, both in absolute number and as a percentage of procedures
performed. Thus it appears safe to conclude that the overall program was effective in
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enhancing the actual outcomes of patients undergoing major surgical procedures. It is
less clear what was responsible for that impact. Analysis of the pre-training baseline data
already demonstrated a significant reduction in complications over the 12 month period.
Examination of the trendlines confirms that there is a fairly constant decrement in both
complications and errors that would appear to antedate the actual training program. And
most importantly, there did not seem to be any change in the percentage of errors that
were attributable to the index errors which were the subject of the training.

The data demonstrate that there was in fact a steady state condition over the 18
months, as evidenced by a very constant number of procedures, a constant distribution of
outcome scores, and a consistent contribution of error to complications. Review of the
number and percent of complications during the twelve months prior to initiation of this
study clearly showed that the reported complication rate was stable. Since the pilot study
had taken place for several months before the actual baseline data collection commenced,
one would assume that the “halo effect” of a change in reporting would most likely be
past. Similarly, any “Hawthorne Effect,” a temporary change in behavior related to the
fact that there was a “study,” would be expected to demonstrate an early change followed
by a return to baseline. This study showed a continuous and ongoing effect over the 18
month period, no decrease after the training, and no rebound return to baseline after time
had elapsed post-training. It therefore seemed surprising that there was a continued slow
decrease in the numbers of complications and the numbers of errors. The absence of a
discrete effect of the training on either the trend lines or on the index errors suggests that
the training program itself was perhaps a minor contributor and the major factor leading
to the improvement in patient outcome was attributable to the fact that everyone in the
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program, resident and attending alike, was participating in error analysis on a weekly
basis over a greater than 18 month period. Perhaps it was the sustained awareness of the
possibility of error, due both to repetition as well as to expectation, that impacted the
“culture” of the surgical program.

It is otherwise difficult to explain the seeming paradox that there was no apparent
focused effect of the training on the material actually trained, yet there was a substantial
decrease in the incidence of complications and errors. It is certainly true that the
measurable outcome, complications, was self-reported and thus there is a possibility of
inaccurate reporting. Countering this is the fact that this reporting mechanism has been
in place for over two decades, is widely accepted, and undergoes weekly oversight by the
chairman and the faculty of the department of surgery. Similarly, the marked consistency
of the distribution of outcome scores and the attribution of impact before and after
training would suggest that the likelihood of bias in data reporting is small. If there had
been a change in reporting, major adverse outcomes (including disability and death)
would continue to be reported, and a change in the reporting of lesser complications
would alter the distribution of outcome scores or percent error. No change in outcome
score was seen, suggesting that both major and minor complications continued to be
reported accurately.

Another theoretical concern is that the training itself was not actually effective.
Although there had been an extensive effort made and supporting data gathered to
indicate that the training would be highly likely to be effective, it is certainly possible that
the training was not, in fact, effective. However, this training module was subjected to
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substantially more analysis and oversight than the majority of training tools used in
surgical education suggesting that it was at least as effective as most comparable training
exercises. It is probably not that surprising that a single, non-repeating training session,
no matter how well designed and implemented, without reinforcment and without
additional feedback, would have minimal transfer from the training environment to the
work environment.

Is it possible that the residents were already well trained in error analysis, and
thus the additional training would produce little to no effect? While this can’t be
summarily dismissed, there is no evidence that any training had taken place prior to this
study. It would appear that residents were “naïve” to error analysis and reporting, and
error analysis was not a component of either the didactic or clinical experience of the
residents.

Also, it is certainly possible that the wrong group of subjects was trained. Most
of the major decisions regarding surgical procedures are made by attending surgeons, not
residents. Specifically, the types of errors identified as being the most common
(judgment errors, incomplete understanding of the problem, carelessness/inattention to
detail) are attributable mostly to the attending physician. This factor cannot be
overlooked in the interpretation of the data. Until a study focused on the attending
surgeon is conducted, it is not possible to say whether training the attending physicians
might have had a more noticeable impact on the incidence of index errors. However, in
spite of this concern, there appears to have been a significant reduction in complications
and errors over the course of the study period.
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This study has made a number of important observations which certainly must be
verified by additional well designed trials.

Hypothesis 1. Is it possible to create a valid classification system for errors occurring in
surgery? Yes, using the published literature as a basis for the classification and using
experts in surgery and in patient safety, it is possible to create a useful classification
system for surgical error. Although there are still traditional perceptions among surgeons
on the nature and types of error as well as the “onus” of error in general, it is surprising
that the agreement among a large number of academic surgeons in the absence of specific
training in medical error was so substantial and consistent across three different surgical
scenarios and a wide range of academic institutions.

Of perhaps greater interest is that the use of the classification system, both in the
validation studies as well as in the actual data collection, showed that the overwhelming
majority of errors occurring in association with surgical complications are NOT due to
system problems or communication problems. This may be due to the fact that the study
was not specifically designed to analyze the possibility of a “cascade” of errors.
However, this study suggests that perhaps in fields of medicine where significant
responsibility and direct risk of harm are in the hands of a single individual, the surgeon,
the number of errors due to the surgeon him/herself may be substantially larger than the
background risk of system and communication errors cited in the current literature. If
this observation is true, it supports the concept that the types of errors most likely to
occur may be different in different fields of medicine and therefore that there is a need for
specific classification systems in different fields of medicine.
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It is also important to highlight that the most “popular” surgical errors currently
being discussed and reported as “sentinel events,” wrong side surgery, wrong patient
surgery, wrong operation, did not occur during the entire 18 month experience. This
suggests that the “extreme” errors that are reported to national and state organizations as
sentinel events are a very small fraction of total error and that they may not be reflective
of the types of errors occurring on a day to day basis in the conduct of surgery.

Hypothesis 2. Can this classification system demonstrate reliability when used by
practicing academic physicians? Yes. As demonstrated in this study, there is a high
degree of consistency among academic surgeons. There is perhaps room for additional
refinement in the classification system, but overall the reliability exceeds the benchmark
of 70% recommended by Wallace. One might argue that the terminology used, originally
selected to be more easily understandable and interpretable by surgeons, was not
sufficiently exclusive, since surgeons seemed to have difficulty deciding whether the
error was due to a specific type of index error. Perhaps a different breakdown of the
individual human factors might be more exclusively and consistently applied to avoid
changing the data collection instrument after it was implemented. As used in this study,
the data instrument was applied identically in both the pre-training and post-training
setting. It was quite interesting, however, to note that surgeons had a similar level of
disagreement about whether an error had occurred as they had in deciding the specific
human factor which was involved in a given scenario. This variability appeared to be
less within the local institution data, suggesting that there is an “institutional
understanding” of what constitutes error, and that this varies from institution to
institution. As additional studies are published which lead to a more “standardized”
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definition of error within the field of surgery, it is likely that the variability between
institutions and the variability between surgeons in their understanding of medical error
will be minimized. This observation suggests that such studies must include a component
of very structured training of the individuals who are going to report error.

Hypothesis 3. Can we determine a baseline incidence of the types of common errors?
Yes. The data would suggest that at the very least, the first 6 months of baseline data
collection was similar to the data collected during the pilot study. In addition, even when
the incidence of complications and errors was decreasing, the distribution of patient
outcomes and the attribution of impact of the errors was remarkably consistent.

Hypothesis 4. Can we reliably identify the most common types of errors in an academic
surgical setting? Yes. Both the validation data and the baseline data demonstrate that
surgeons in an academic setting, with minimal specific training in medical error can
reliably assess the presence and type of error (as demonstrated by greater than 70%
agreement, agreement between outside academic surgeons and internal ongoing data
collection, and constancy within an institution over an 18 month period of data
collection). The data, at least as collected, show that the majority of errors occurring in
surgery are not system errors or communication errors. This may be counter to current
“wisdom” in the field of error analysis, and it is likely that the outcomes would be very
different in fields such as radiation oncology or anesthesiology, where the actual “action”
is very dependent on equipment, where the consequences of actions are in fact very
tightly “coupled” ( doing “x” likely leads immediately to “y”). This observation
reinforces our recommendation that classification systems for error should be specialty
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specific, based on data collected in that specialty. At least as observed in this study,
human factors appear to be responsible for the majority of errors in surgery, and these
tend to cluster around the actions of the surgeon in the specific areas referred to as index
errors: errors in judgment, incomplete understanding of the problem, and
carelessness/inattention to detail.)

Hypothesis 5. Can we measure the impact of error on the actual outcomes of patients?
Yes. The validity testing among the academic surgeons demonstrated a high degree of
consistency in scoring the outcome and defining the degree to which the complication
was the result of error. This was further supported by the consistent responses over time
in the broader clinical context of baseline and post-training data collection. In fact, the
total surgical experience of a large, complex academic institution, as measured in the
baseline data collection, showed remarkable stability in the decisions of the surgeons
reporting the impact of error on patient outcome.

Hypothesis 6. Can we develop and validate a simulation-based training module for
resident physicians? Yes. Using the experience of a large number of academic surgeons
and then reviewed by other groups of academic surgeons with special expertise in
developing training materials resulted in a “training package” which was determined to
be “effective.” It is of some concern that this training program did not appear to
“transfer” to the work environment. The training program used in this study is at least as
rigorous as the majority of training materials currently in use in graduate medical
education. Further, the degree of review and analysis was substantially greater than is
typically used in medical training programs. One can conclude that it is possible to
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validate the training module as perceived by experts. One cannot necessarily extend that
assessment to include the effectiveness of the module to transfer to the workplace and
improve patient outcome.

Hypothesis 7. Can a validated training module improve surgical outcomes after a cohort
of residents is trained? Uncertain. It is clear that the overall project resulted in a
substantial decrease in complications and also in errors. So the overall project resulted in
an improvement in patient outcome. But it is not clear that the actual training module
was responsible for this outcome. It may be more likely that the continuous exposure to
analysis of error resulted in a systemic change in attitudes and a greater awareness of
error. It is not possible to conclusively answer this question at this time, although the
trend line analysis clearly suggests that the change in outcome was apparent months
before the training module was conducted. Most importantly, there is no evidence of any
change in the types of errors specifically trained, either in a before or after, distribution
free comparison or in the regression analysis with ANOVA.

Power Analysis. Using the number of surgical procedures performed as the
determining factor for sample size, and not error, a power of 0.10 would require about
7000 procedures in each group. Since there were over 9000 procedures in the baseline
group, and approximately 5000 procedures in the post-training group, the power of a
before-after comparison is probably about 0.20. The regression or trend line of the data
over the entire 18 months should be sufficiently powered to be able to identify a
difference if a difference is present.
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Confidence. Confidence must be considered from both the statistical sense as
well as the reasonability sense. Statistically, 95% confidence intervals were utilized for
all comparisons and all regressions. The Kolmogorov Smirnov test was used to assess
normality of the data when parametric procedures were employed. Fisher’s Exact Test
was used to analyze frequency data to avoid the need to consider normality, particularly
when addressing conditional probabilities and frequencies. Consequently the data
analysis should be rigorous and unbiased, and therefore likely to be “accurate.” Of more
importance, however, is the level of confidence that the final conclusion is consistent
with modern theories of training (reasonability). Particularly since our conclusions
question several concepts that are currently strongly held, most notably that the errors in
surgery were NOT typically system errors or communication errors and that a well
designed training module did not appear to produce improvements in the quality of care,
the results must also “make sense.” To accomplish this, it is important to clearly
distinguish between the literature in “patient safety” and the literature in “organizational
training.” Clearly, the training literature is emphatic that effective training requires
repetition, frequent assessment with feedback, overlearning, and reinforcement, which
were not a component of this training module nor is it typically included in most
“courses” provided for residents. Accordingly, it is reasonable to accept with confidence
that a single training module, no matter how well designed and implemented, may NOT
transfer to the clinical environment at a different time and place. Similarly, it is
reasonable to accept that requiring the residents to consider the possibility of error in a
formal way every week over an extended period of time IS very likely to result in a
sustained attention to the possibility of error, which could become incorporated into the
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day to day activities of the workplace (transfer of training). Isolated training modules
are certainly useful, but as an adjunct to a larger, more robust and sustained training
process that will impact on the broader culture of the medical learning and practice
environment.

5.2 Future Plans

This study has raised two very provocative possibilities: 1.) that in some areas of
healthcare individual human factors errors may be more important causes of adverse
events than system or communication error, and 2.) that well designed single episode
training sessions may not transfer to the workplace to patient outcome. The most
important next step is to reproduce the results. This will require conducting a similar
study at a new clinical site. Although much of the validation and reliability testing will
not need to be repeated, baseline data will need to be accumulated. As evidenced in this
study, the collection of only 6 months of baseline data would probably have overlooked
the importance of the changes which occurred during the baseline period as a
consequence of the weekly data analysis and reporting. Therefore it will require a model
similar to the present study. However, this study demonstrated that the percentage of
major complications associated with error may be stable, suggesting that a corroborating
study could use historical complication rates over a period of time, compared to similarly
collected complication rates after a training experience. While such a study would not
include “granular” information regarding types of errors, outcome scores, impact on
patients, it could be done much more simply. Alternatively, a study could introduce a
regular error analysis to the existing morbidity and mortality process, WITHOUT a
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formal training module, to determine if simply having residents analyze and report errors
will result in a decrease in complications and errors.

A provocative possibility for future study is training the attending physicians
instead of the residents. Since many of the decisions made in the planning and execution
of a surgical procedure, including preoperative and postoperative care, are either made or
approved by the attending physician, training the attending may be more effective than
training the resident. Whether this is culturally feasible in most institutions will
determine whether such a study can be conducted.

Future studies might include several components which were not included in this
study. Such additional measures might include a cascade analysis, to determine if the
evident error is a component of a chain of errors; a systems analysis, to determine if the
evident error is a component of a system of organized activities; and a preventability
analysis, to determine if and at what stage the error could reasonably have been identified
and prevented from occurring. These were not included because of the substantial
advanced knowledge that would be required of the individuals submitting the weekly
information, which would have biased the interpretation of any results. Inclusion of these
supplementary considerations in future studies will enhance the robustness of the
conclusions and facilitate the future application of patient safety training. This would
presumably require a highly trained staff for data collection and a formal training
program for the physicians.

An important component of error analysis is the recognition of latent errors (near
miss). An effective program of near miss analysis will contribute substantially to the
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identification of latent errors, before they occur. In this study, the voluntary program of
near miss reporting was unsuccessful. There are many reasons to explain this. It was
inconvenient. It required initiative on the part of the resident to report. It involved an
interruption of workflow. It wasn’t “user-friendly” in the sense of a well-designed “front
end” with prompts and selections to facilitate reporting. A well-designed, easy-to-use,
and readily available process that does not interrupt workflow, should allow reporting
and analysis of a high volume of near misses and potentially uncover latent system errors
which may contribute to or underlie the human factor errors recognized in the post-hoc
analysis of surgical complications. Recognition of the most common types of near miss
events could be extremely helpful in designing future training modules to minimize
surgical error.

5.3 Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that it is possible to develop and validate a
classification system for error in surgery. In addition, the data have demonstrated that the
types of errors in surgery may be different than in other areas of medicine, reaffirming
that error classification is probably domain specific, and suggesting a benchmark that
studies which address medical error should focus on the types of error likely to occur and
include validation of the classification system utilized. Finally, since the purpose of
analyzing errors and developing training programs to enhance patient safety is to actually
decrease medical errors, programs that are intended to improve patient safety should
actually measure outcomes that are relevant to patient safety. This should include the
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analysis of the types, frequency, and severity of error within the relevant medical content
domain.

This study has demonstrated that the process of measuring error on a regular basis
as a component of morbidity and mortality analysis leads to a sustained reduction in
complications presumably by decreasing the errors which appear to be tightly linked to
them. It also suggests that a one-time, focused training program which addresses
specific, common types of errors may have minimal effect on patient outcomes.
Recurring training with feedback and reinforcement may rectify this apparent limitation.

Most importantly, this study supports the concept that it is the culture of safety
which will influence patient outcome, more than a specific training program. To the
degree that training modules consistently maintain and augment this culture of safety,
they will be an important component. Emphasis on the training module rather than on the
culture may have limited effect on the goal of this endeavor, safer surgical care for
patients.
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Appendix 1. Letter to Expert Evaluators for External Validation of Scoring
Template
Dear Doctor,
I recently made the decision to pursue a PhD in Industrial Engineering. I know it sounds
crazy, but I believe it will help me to address the systems and processes problems which
plague modern healthcare and, more particularly, graduate medical education. My
dissertation project involves the intersection of three important themes: GME, patient
safety, and medical simulation. In order to proceed, I need to validate a scoring form
which I designed for morbidity and mortality conference. The intended use is that each
complication gets evaluated to determine if there was a medical error, some
characteristics of the medical error, the actual type of error involved, and the percentage
of the complication that seems attributable to the error (as opposed to the disease).
As an expert in the field of academic surgery, I would like you to take just a few minutes
and complete a scoring template on three very brief scenarios. In each case, there clearly
was a complication. I would like you to determine:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

what was the complication (just a few words)
if the complication was due to a medical error
if the medical error occurred during evaluation or execution
if the error was a “slip” (doing the right thing but incorrectly)
if the error was a “mistake” (doing the wrong thing)
what types of error (can be more than one) are involved, by placing a “1” in the
appropriate box for the most important, a “2” for the next most important, etc.
7. which of the ACGME core competencies appears to be involved
8. what percentage of the complication can be attributed to the error (in multiples of
25%)
Your response is anonymous. I will only track two pieces of information: what
institution you are from (by a code number, not name) and how many years since you
finished your general surgery residency (provided by you).
I am including the three scenarios, a glossary of terms, and three scoring templates. You
can return them in the included envelope or by FAX to ………….
Thank you in advance for your help. I believe this project will lead to a significant
improvement in how we teach residents and, ultimately, how we provide surgical care to
our patients.
Sincerely,
Peter J. Fabri M.D.
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Appendix 2. Mock-up of Scoring Template with Instructions

Figure 12. Error Template as Sent to Evaluators
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Appendix 3. Glossary of Terms Used in the Error Template and Instructions
Glossary of Terms Used in Error Analysis
ERROR- a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence of
mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, not by chance.
VIOLATION- a generic term to describe actions that are wrong, that violate “the law”.
For example, running a red light.
ADVERSE EVENT- an error in which patient harm has occurred.
NEAR MISS- an error which is “caught” before any harm has occurred. This could be
that the event was planned or even initiated but not actually carried out, or it could be
carried out and the adverse effect was prevented from occurring.
SLIPS AND LAPSES are errors which result from some failure in the execution and/or
storage of an action sequence. (doing perhaps the correct thing, but doing it incorrectly).
MISTAKES are deficiencies or failures in the judgmental and/or inferential processes
involved in the selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to achieve it
(doing the wrong thing).
ERRORS typically occur either during evaluation/planning or during execution. Errors
occurring during evaluation/planning are generally “mistakes”. Errors occurring during
execution are generally “slips”. Errors occurring during information processing are
generally “lapses”.
ERROR TYPES. Errors are usually divided into three main categories, organizational,
technical, and human.
HEALTH SYSTEM ERROR (Organizational or System Error). This category can
include any error due to failure of the “system” in getting things done. It could be an
error of commission (this is how the organization does things) or omission (we don’t
have a procedure to prevent that.)
TECHNICAL/MECHANICAL ERROR. In healthcare, the term technical is often
associated with “technique”. To avoid confusion, we consider a “technical error” to be a
human error and not a mechanical malfunction. Thus there are organizational (health
system), mechanical, and human errors.
HUMAN FACTORS. There are many classification systems for error caused by how
humans function as individuals. The classification system is often specific to the type of
activity being performed and uses language comfortable to the individuals working in the
area. In surgery, we have identified the following workable classification system:

111

Appendix 3. (Continued)
Incomplete understanding of the problem – making a decision or committing an
action based on incomplete or inaccurate information. This is an error of cognition.
Failure to follow an existing protocol- not using a protocol where one exists and is
known.
Inattention to detail- usually misinterpreting subtle findings. This is usually an
error due to haste or carelessness.
Error in diagnosis- This specifically relates to when a diagnosis has been made
and an action taken, but the diagnosis was formally incorrect.
Failure in communication- This type of error occurs when there is a
communication breakdown between human beings that leads to someone committing an
error.
Error in judgment- this occurs when an individual violates a “rule”, but has
correct information.
Delay in diagnosis/treatment. This error occurs when an excessive amount of
time has elapsed, leading to progression of disease or a complication of disease.
Error of omission- This error occurs when someone fails to do something
indicated.
Technical error- This error occurs in the process of a procedure requiring
technical skill, in which the procedure is not done sufficiently well. This could be due to
insufficient understanding of what to do or just not doing it well enough.
INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM. This is NOT the same as error in
diagnosis, although it could be closely related. For example, if a patient on a ventilator is
hypoventilating and having respiratory difficulty, you don’t figure out that the tube is
down the main stem bronchus, and the patient arrests, that’s incomplete understanding of
problem. But if you put in a chest tube, that’s an error in diagnosis. In the first case, you
made the correct diagnosis but didn’t figure out the exact mechanism. If it took you four
hours to figure this out, it would ALSO be a delay error. So this error term means you
didn’t get all the way to the end of the diagnostic tree.
FAILURE TO USE ESTABLISHED PROTOCOL An example of this could be in a
code, in a trauma resuscitation, etc, if you fail to use the ACLS or ATLS protocol. This
should be used when there is actually a protocol that everybody is aware of. NOT just
this isn’t the way we usually do it! It could also be a chemotherapy protocol, or a dialysis
protocol, or a TPN protocol.
CARELESSNESS/INATTENTION TO DETAIL This error code should be used when
there really was carelessness or inattention to detail and not a scapegoat term for another
type of error (e.g. communication error, judgment error) although the two could certainly
coexist. This occurs when somebody really isn’t paying attention. For example, if you
pack the small bowel under a towel and hold it out of the field with a wide retractor, only
to find out an hour later that a segment of the small bowel infarcted because of blocked
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Appendix 3. (Continued)
blood supply. Or you are coming across the transverse mesocolon and divide the
superior mesenteric artery instead of the middle colic. (this could also be a technique
error). Or taking out a segment of the colon that turns out not to include the pathology.
ERROR IN DIAGNOSIS This term applies when you treat the patient for disease X and
the patient has disease Y. In the simplest case, taking out a normal appendix is an error
in diagnosis. As a more complex example, opening a chest for cardiac tamponade in the
ICU in a patient with a tension pneumothorax is an error in diagnosis.
COMMUNICATION ERROR This could include a botched verbal order, as well as a
failure to communicate. Make sure the actual error is related to the communication and
not to something else.
JUDGMENT ERROR This error type should be assigned when it is clear that someone
with more experience wouldn’t have made this mistake. This could also be a secondary
type of error combined with another type.
DELAY ERROR This type of error should be considered when there is clearly a
temporal delay which contributed to the patient outcome. If the patient outcome was not
affected by the delay, it probably isn’t a delay error.
ERROR OF OMISSION This occurs when something important isn’t done. If it is part
of a written
protocol, it would be a protocol failure. Not getting an appropriate imaging study in a
patient with
an aortic aneurysm and hypertension and the patient developing postoperative renal
failure might be an error of omission. Or failure to use DVT prophylaxis in a situation
where it would be considered to be important (malignancy, obesity, long procedure, prior
DVT, etc.)
TECHNIQUE ERROR I think we all know this when we see it. Cutting the common
duct (although it could also be carelessness), obstructing the renal artery on an aortic
aneurysm repair, etc. Use this when the complication is actually do to something that
was done to the patient which, if done correctly, would have avoided the complication.
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Appendix 4. Instructions for Using the Error Evaluation Template
The instructions for completing the template are straightforward. The sheet is divided
into three areas, numbered 1, 2, 3. At the bottom is an abbreviated set of instructions for
reference.
Section 1 is a set of simple statements. For “Patient ID”, indicate the scenario number, 1,
2, or 3. Leave “Reviewer” blank. Enter a number from 1-5 from the instructions at the
bottom to indicate your assessment of the severity of the complication.
Please note that a “1” means that there was definitely a complication (e.g.
enterotomy, arterial injury, the wrong medication but without adverse effect, etc.)
but there was no adverse effect on the patient noted.
A “2” means that the patient was affected adversely, probably lengthening
hospital stay, but this didn’t translate into a significant impact on the patient and
no disability (minor wound infection, cystitis treated with oral antibiotics, etc.)
A “3” means when the patient left the hospital, there was still some definite
disability (major wound affecting mobility, swollen leg, still needed oxygen, etc.
A “4” means the patient will almost certainly have a permanent disability.
A “5” means the patient died, period, regardless of cause.
Next, answer the simple questions. First, yes, there was a complication. Otherwise we
wouldn’t be here. Was there an error? If no, you don’t need to do any more. If yes, was
the error in evaluation/assessment/planning or was it an error of execution/commission?
Was the error due to a “slip” (doing the right thing incorrectly) or a mistake (doing the
wrong thing). Assume that it can’t be both.

Section 2 has two parts, identifying the types of medical error involved on the left side,
and identifying which ACGME competency might be involved on the right side. For the
medical error, there can be more than one. Put a “1” next to the most important error,
followed by “2”, “3”, etc next to any additional errors you think are involved.

Section 3 asks you to identify in increments of 25%, how much of the complication that
you scored at the beginning you would attribute to the error(s) you identified (the
remainder being due to the patients disease processes rather than the treatment.
Thanks again for your help.
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Appendix 5. Morbidity and Mortality Scenario 1 for External Validation
A 45 year old female was admitted to the hospital for an elective laparoscopic
cholecystectomy. She had a prior hysterectomy through a Pfannenstiel incision a number
of years ago and has had no other previous abdominal surgery. Prior to beginning the
operation, we verified a lower abdominal “smile” incision just above the pubis. An
infraumbilical curvilinear incision was made and the umbilicus mobilized. The umbilical
ring was bluntly dilated with a Kelly clamp and a port was introduced into the peritoneal
cavity. As soon as the scope was introduced, succus was seen. The procedure was
converted to open and a tear was confirmed in a loop of ileum adherent to the umbilicus.
This was repaired and the gall bladder was removed. There were no postoperative
complications.
Errors: 1. Judgment 2. Technique
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Appendix 6. Morbidity and Mortality Scenario 2 for External Validation
A 72 year old male was admitted through the Emergency Department after presenting
with a complaint of left back pain. He is known to be hypertensive and a smoker. An
abdominal CT scan confirms the presence of an abdominal aortic aneurysm with a
confined area of leak into the retroperitoneum. After initial stabilization, he is brought to
the operating room and undergoes a transabdominal aortic aneurysm repair with a tube
graft. There is no back-bleeding noted from the inferior mesenteric artery orifice, which
is oversewn prior to placing the graft. The iliac vessels are calcified but not aneurysmal.
Prior to abdominal closure, the sigmoid colon is noted to be normal and signals can be
heard on the antimesenteric border with the Doppler. Postoperatively he does well and is
transferred from the intensive care unit on POD #2. On POD #5, he notes lower
abdominal pain which progresses. Abdominal films are obtained which demonstrate free
air. He is returned to the operating room and is found to have an ischemic perforation of
the sigmoid colon. The sigmoid colon is resected and an end colostomy with closure of
the distal colon (Hartmann procedure) are performed. The case is discussed at Morbidity
and Mortality conference in detail and it is determined that the standard of care had been
met, and with discussion of possible alternatives of postoperative care including a
second look procedure and postoperative proctoscopy. On POD #5 after his colostomy,
the patient has still not opened up. Abdominal films confirm gas through the GI tract,
including a somewhat dilated colon. A gastrograffin enema per rectum demonstrates
passage of the contrast into the colostomy bag. The patient is taken back to the operating
room where it is noted that the distal rectum was brought up as the colostomy and the end
of the sigmoid colon was left stapled and oversewn. This was corrected and the patient
recovered without incident.
Error: 1. Inattention to detail
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Appendix 7. Morbidity and Mortality Scenario 3 for External Validation
A 56 year old female was admitted through the emergency room with signs and
symptoms of intestinal obstruction. She did not have any evidence of an acute abdomen,
although her abdomen was tender to palpation. She was noted to have had multiple prior
operations, and she had a large piece of mesh placed in her anterior abdominal wall to
repair an incisional hernia at her last operation. She had received radiation therapy to the
pelvis in the remote past. She weighs over 300 pounds and has had prior admissions for
intestinal obstruction which have all resolved without need for operation. Abdominal
films demonstrated scattered air-fluid levels at multiple levels of the small bowel and
minimal gas in the colon, but with no free air or pneumatosis. A CT scan of the abdomen
was performed which confirmed dilated loops of intestine and raised the question of a
closed loop of bowel, although there was gas apparently distal to this area. Her WBC
was 20,000, but the remainder of her laboratory studies, including amylase and blood
gases, were normal. She was taken immediately to surgery. At operation, there was no
clear transition point noted, no obvious closed loop obstruction, and no ischemic bowel.
The mesh was densely adherent to the intestine and several enterotomies were made,
necessitating resection of a segment of small intestine with primary anastomosis. Her
abdomen was closed by reapproximating the prior mesh, which was densely incorporated
into the abdominal wall without any separation. On postoperative day three, she was
noted to have intestinal contents draining from her incision. Her fascia was opened
locally and the site of drainage from the intestine could be seen in the open wound.
Error: Judgment
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Appendix 8. Scenario Script: Operating Room
Scene opening: Two men, one older, one younger, in scrub suits at the scrub sink
scrubbing their hands for surgery. The older is the surgeon and the younger is a resident.
Surgeon: Gee, Bob. I really wish I didn’t have to do this complicated redo case now
after being up all night with that trauma patient.
Resident: Why don’t we ask the OR supervisor and the nurse anesthetist if we can delay
the case until this afternoon so that you can get some rest. The patient isn’t asleep yet.
Surgeon: No. That wouldn’t be fair to the patient. Besides, I was trained to work without
any sleep.
Fade out and fade into the middle of the surgical procedure. The surgeons are in the
middle of the operation. The anesthetist is behind the ether screen, but visible. The scrub
nurse is there, next to the surgeon. The surgeons appear to be working deep in the pelvis.
Nurse Anesthetist: Are you losing much blood down there?
Surgeon: Nope, everything is pretty dry.
Short time passes
Nurse Anesthetist: Are you sure you’re not losing blood?
Surgeon: We’re fine here, Suzie, really.
Short time passes. The nurse anesthetist hangs a unit of blood. Short time passes.
Surgeon: Suzie, I think something is wrong, the blood looks awfully dark. Is everything
okay? (continuing to work in the pelvis)
Short time passes:
Nurse Anesthetist: We have a problem here. I’ve given a boatload of fluid and some
blood. I’m having trouble with the blood pressure. I started some phenylephrine to bring
his pressure up.
Surgeon: You gave him blood! Why didn’t you tell me you were giving blood. We
haven’t lost much at all. You really ought to tell me before you give my patients blood.
And when did you start the phenylephrine. Can you get the anesthesiologist in here right
away?
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Anesthesiologist enters: Well, looking at the EKG I would say that we’re in the middle
of an MI. You better hurry up and get this patient to the ICU.
Fade out, fade in. Still in the OR.
Scrub nurse: It looks like we’re missing a sponge, doctor.
Surgeon: That’s all I need! (puts his arm into the pelvis) Nope, no sponges here. Let’s
close. I’m sure we have all the sponges out.
Scrub nurse: Don’t you think we should get an x-ray?
Surgeon: How long is it going to take?
Scrub nurse: Probably ten minutes at most.
Surgeon: No, let’s get out of here. This guy needs to get to the ICU.
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Appendix 9. Armchair Conference
Set up like a Sunday morning talk show. One person in suit, three in scrub suits.
MC- Welcome, doctors. You had a chance to review the case. What are your thoughts?
Doctor 1. Well, I think there were several things that could have been improved. First, I
think the surgeon has a responsibility to the patient to be awake and alert. Recent
evidence is very clear that fatigue really does impair performance. The problem is that
the surgeon isn’t aware of the impairment. I think the surgeon should have made the
effort to get the case postponed until the afternoon.
Doctor 2. I agree. But it isn’t part of the culture of surgery. We all think that we can do
anything and everything.
Doctor 3. It isn’t part of the culture of the operating room either. But the surgeon is
responsible for the patient and really needs to take a leadership role here.
Doctor 1. Then I think there was poor communication during the procedure. Generally
when the anesthetist asks me if I’m losing blood, it means there is something wrong at
the head of the table. As the surgeon, I need to take the initiative to ask a few questions.
Maybe it wouldn’t have made a difference in the outcome, but a half hour of lead time or
a cardiologist in the OR wouldn’t hurt.
Doctor 2. I agree. It isn’t enough for the surgeon to be technically competent. The
surgeon needs to be able to be aware of what’s going on around him. In aviation, they
call that situational awareness.
Doctor 3. I agree too. And this is more than the old “captain of the team” issue. The
operating room is a complex place that requires frequent assessment of what is going on.
The surgeon needs to be part of the solution.
Doctor 1. Finally, I think we have learned from experience that an incorrect sponge
count is usually an incorrect sponge count. Most hospitals have protocols that require
that a film is taken before the patient leaves the OR. I myself would have started closing
the abdomen while they were getting x-ray. We would have had the film back before the
skin was closed. If there were a sponge, and I’m pretty sure there was, we could have
removed it while the patient was still in the OR.
Doctor 2. True. But I think it’s more than that. A missing sponge is one of those
problems that you can’t talk your way out of. Surgeons really need to be more involved
in paying attention to where sponges are left. It’s one of those details that can avoid a
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lawsuit. Whenever I place a sponge in the abdomen, I make sure I tell the scrub nurse
that there is a sponge in the abdomen. It doesn’t take any time, and it helps me keep
track.
Doctor 3. I can’t disagree. I was sued once. Since then, keeping track of the sponges is
one of those details I never overlook.
Doctor 1. So we agree that there was probably poor judgment in going ahead with the
case.
Doctor 2. And we agree that the surgeon didn’t try to understand the situation when the
anesthetist was obviously trying to find a clue.
Doctor 3. And unless the patient is really crashing, and you’re planning to come back,
the surgeon needs to pay attention to details and follow the protocols.
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Appendix 10. Follow-up Scenario Script: Without Errors
Follow-up script.
Surgeon and resident at scrub sink:
Surgeon: Gee, Bob. I really wish I didn’t have to do this case now after being up all
night with that trauma patient.
Resident: This redo could be really complicated. Why don’t we ask the OR supervisor
and the nurse anesthetist if we can delay the case until this afternoon so that you can get
some rest. The patient isn’t asleep yet.
Surgeon: You know, you may be right. I recently read that fatigue leads to a significant
deterioration in ability to function, but that individuals are often not aware of the
impairment. I would hate to harm this patient. I’ll talk to the OR supervisor and nurse
anesthetist, and if they agree I’ll talk to the patient about waiting til this afternoon.
Fade out and fade into the middle of the surgical procedure. The surgeons are in the
middle of the operation. The anesthetist is behind the ether screen, but visible. The scrub
nurse is there, next to the surgeon. The surgeons appear to be working deep in the pelvis.
Nurse Anesthetist: Are you losing much blood down there?
Surgeon: Nope, everything is pretty dry. Is everything okay up there?
Short time passes
Nurse Anesthetist: Are you sure you’re not losing blood?
Surgeon: Suzie, why don’t I stop what I’m doing for a moment and let you figure out
what’s going on. (short pause) Is there anything that I can do to help you? (short pause)
Perhaps we should get the anesthesiologist as well. Maybe three heads are better than
one.
Nurse Anesthetist: Well there is no doubt that something is going on. Since you don’t
think it’s due to blood loss, I guess we need to look into this further. Let’s get Dr.
Roberts (looking toward presumed location of circulating nurse).
Anesthesiologist: Well, well. What do we have here. I think we better look for some
other options. Just glancing at the monitor, I wonder if we might have an evolving acute
cardiac event. Let’s get some cardiac enzymes. And let’s look at the medications
we’ve given. And let’s start treating him for acute ischemia. And we better wrap up this
operation as quickly as we can.
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Appendix 10. (Continued)
Fade out, fade in. Still in the OR.
Scrub nurse: It looks like we’re missing a sponge, doctor.
Surgeon: Can you quickly recheck the count. Since it looks like our patient may have
had an MI, we really need to get to the intensive care unit as soon as we can. And you
better call x-ray right away so that we don’t lose any time. I can start closing while we’re
waiting for the film.
Scrub nurse: You told me to remind you that you put a sponge up over the liver. Did you
take that one out?
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Appendix 11. Fact Sheet - STAN, the METI Human Patient Simulator
Human Patient Simulator™ by Medical Education Technologies, Inc.™ (METI™)
METI’s HPS-- Human Patient Simulator: Known as Stan (short for Stan D. Ardman or
Standard Man) is a virtual patient capable of simulating nearly any possible human medical
emergency including allergic reactions, the effects of nerve gas or weapons of mass
destruction, drug overdoses, a severed limb or other traumatic injuries.
Creating a real life or death situation: Able to recognize and respond to medical treatment
and drugs, once an emergency scenario is started, Stan becomes a real “life” placed in the
hands of students that must diagnose and administer the correct treatment. Mistakes can send
Stan into cardiac arrest and result in death, thus making any scenario, truly, life or death.
Lifelike human characteristics: Each Stan unit is built to simulate human characteristics and
functions including blinking and dilating eyes, tearing, drooling, bleeding, pulsing, inhaling
oxygen, exhaling carbon dioxide (with chest movement), talking, urinating, swelling tongue, etc.
Interactive Simulation: The Stan is completely interactive. Instructors use software to enter
various emergency scenarios for which students are challenged to recognize according to the
simulator’s actions. The simulator then responds directly to the treatment as administered by
the students. No interaction from the instructor is needed once the program has begun.
Students can practice skills over and over again until mastery is achieved.
Emergency Scenarios: METI has designed Stan to simulate physical (bleeding, pupil dilation)
and physiological (pulse, heartbeat) characteristics for 100s of possible medical emergency
situations.
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Appendix 11. (Continued)
Who uses METI: Over 700 organizations worldwide utilize METI’s technology including NASA,
Center for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. and foreign military, leading medical schools such as
Harvard, UCLA, Cleveland Clinic, Mount Sinai, Stanford and more.
Emergency Training Facts: The majority of emergency professionals enter the field having
only practiced on lifeless mannequins and do not experience their first real emergency situation
until after they have completed training and enter the workforce.
Training uses: Emergency preparedness, Disaster Training, Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Bio Terrorism, Advanced Disaster Life Support, Advanced Cardiac Life Support, Advanced
Trauma Life Support and more.
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Appendix 12. Simulation Script: Recovery Room
Actors: PACU nurse, possibly anesthesiologist
Equipment: bed, patient, monitor (BP,HR), IV apparatus, chart, anesthesia record, preop
record, EKG with acute MI from different patient, drugs (Beta blocker, levophed,
epinephrine, oxygen,
Patient has been in the PACU for about an hour after a laparoscopic cholecystectomy.
Unknown to the PACU nurse, the surgeon had bleeding from the cystic artery, which
stopped spontaneously, and the cystic artery was never clipped. The surgeon and resident
who did the procedure are scrubbed in the OR on another case. The PACU paged the
resident doing the simulation, who has never met the patient and was not present during
the operation, but is on the general surgery service.
Nurse: Thanks for coming doctor. This is Mister Bob Smith. He is 65 years old. He
underwent a laparoscopic cholecystectomy today and has been here in the PACU for
about 45 minutes. Dr. Miller did the operation, but he is scrubbed on another procedure
in OR 3. The patient has been a little tachycardic since arrival and has received two 500
cc boluses of fluid. His blood pressure has been running between 90 and 100 the whole
time and didn’t seem to come up with fluid. The PACU anesthesiologist increased the
maintenance IV fluids to 150 ml/hr and ordered an EKG. I gave Mister Smith 2 mg of IV
morphine and his systolic fell to 70. We gave him another 500 cc of saline, but his
pressure is still 70. He was complaining of some pain in his xyphoid area before the
morphine.
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